


MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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**131st Maine State Legislature
Committee Activity**

Committee: Veterans and Legal Affairs

LD: 2232

Title: An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures

Public Hearing(s): 03/06/24 1:05 PM

Work Session(s): 03/12/24 1:30 PM

Reported Out: 03/19/2024

Committee Report(s): ONTP

Committee History: 3/12/2024 2:16:49 PM Work Session Held
3/12/2024 2:17:03 PM Voted



131st MAINE LEGISLATURE

SECOND REGULAR SESSION-2024

Legislative Document

No. 2232

I.B. 5

House of Representatives, February 28, 2024

An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures

Transmitted to the Clerk of the 131st Maine Legislature by the Secretary of State on
February 27, 2024 and ordered printed.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Rlt B. Hunt".

ROBERT B. HUNT
Clerk

1 Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows:

2 Sec. 1. 21-A MRSA §1015, sub-§2-C is enacted to read:

3 2-C. Contributions by individuals to political action committees making
4 independent expenditures. An individual may not make contributions aggregating more
5 than \$5,000 in any calendar year to a political action committee for the purpose of making
6 independent expenditures under section 1019-B, subsection 1. Beginning December 1,
7 2024, contribution limits in accordance with this subsection are adjusted every 2 years
8 based on the Consumer Price Index as reported by the United States Department of Labor,
9 Bureau of Labor Statistics and rounded to the nearest amount divisible by \$25. The
10 commission shall post the current contribution limit and the amount of the next adjustment
11 and the date that it will become effective on its publicly accessible website and include this
12 information with any publication to be used as a guide for candidates.

13 Sec. 2. 21-A MRSA §1015, sub-§2-D is enacted to read:

14 2-D. Contributions by political action committees and business entities to political
15 action committees making independent expenditures. A leadership political action
16 committee, a separate segregated fund committee, a caucus political action committee, any
17 other political action committee or any business entity may not make contributions
18 aggregating more than \$5,000 in any calendar year to a political action committee for the
19 purpose of making independent expenditures under section 1019-B, subsection 1.
20 Beginning December 1, 2024, contribution limits in accordance with this subsection are
21 adjusted every 2 years based on the Consumer Price Index as reported by the United States
22 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and rounded to the nearest amount
23 divisible by \$25. The commission shall post the current contribution limit and the amount
24 of the next adjustment and the date that it will become effective on its publicly accessible
25 website and include this information with any publication to be used as a guide for
26 candidates. For purposes of this subsection, "business entity" includes a firm, partnership,
27 corporation, incorporated association, labor organization or other organization, whether
28 organized as a for-profit or a nonprofit entity.

29 Sec. 3. 21-A MRSA §1019-B, sub-§4, ¶B, as amended by PL 2023, c. 324, §12,
30 is further amended to read:

31 B. A report required by this subsection must contain an itemized account of the total
32 contributions from each contributor, each expenditure in excess of \$250 in any one
33 candidate's election, the date and purpose of each expenditure and the name of each
34 payee or creditor. The report must state whether the expenditure is in support of or in
35 opposition to the candidate and must include, under penalty of unsworn falsification,
36 as provided in Title 17-A, section 453, a statement whether the expenditure is made in
37 cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, the
38 candidate or an authorized committee or agent of the candidate.

39 Sec. 4. 21-A MRSA §1019-B, sub-§6 is enacted to read:

40 6. Segregated contributions required. A political action committee may use only
41 funds received in compliance with section 1015, subsection 2-C or 2-D when making
42 independent expenditures. A political action committee that makes independent
43 expenditures shall keep an account of any contributions received for the purpose of making
44 those expenditures.

SUMMARY

This initiated bill limits the amount of contributions that may be made by individuals and by political action committees and business entities to political action committees that make independent expenditures. In both cases, the aggregate limit is \$5,000 in any calendar year.

STATE OF MAINE
131ST LEGISLATURE

LEGISLATIVE NOTICES

JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

Sen. Craig Hickman, Senate Chair

Rep. Laura Supica, House Chair

PUBLIC HEARING: Wednesday, March 6, 2024, 1:05 PM, State House, Room 437

(L.D. 2232) Bill "An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures" (IB0005)

CONTACT PERSON:

Michelle Hebert
100 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0100
287-1310

WORK SESSION AGENDA

VETERANS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

3/12/2024

1:30 PM

State House, Room 437

- (L.D. 1695) Bill "An Act to Provide for the Direct Shipment of Spirits to Consumers" (SP0682) (Presented by Senator STEWART, T. of Aroostook) (Cosponsored by Senator POULIOT, M. of Kennebec, Senator HICKMAN, C. of Kennebec, Senator PIERCE, T. of Cumberland, Representative RUDNICKI, S. of Fairfield, Representative O'CONNELL, K. of Brewer, Representative DILL, J. of Old Town)
- (L.D. 2014) Bill "An Act Regarding Spirits Price Regulation " (SP0836)
- (L.D. 2232) Bill "An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures" (IB0005)
- (L.D. 2259) Bill "An Act to Prohibit Receiving Compensation for Assisting a Person to Obtain Veterans' Benefits Except as Permitted Under Federal Law" (SP0976) (Presented by Senator FARRIN, B. of Somerset) (Cosponsored by Representative FAULKINGHAM, B. of Winter Harbor, President JACKSON, T. of Aroostook, Senator STEWART, T. of Aroostook, Senator DAUGHTRY, M. of Cumberland, Senator HICKMAN, C. of Kennebec, Senator KEIM, L. of Oxford, Senator TIMBERLAKE, J. of Androscoggin, Speaker TALBOT ROSS, R. of Portland, Representative ARATA, A. of New Gloucester) Approved for introduction by a majority of the Legislative Council pursuant to Joint Rule 205.

CONTACT PERSON:

Michelle Hebert

100 State House Station

Augusta, ME 04333-0100

287-1310

IN-PERSON TESTIMONY SIGN IN SHEET

Committee: VLADate: 3-6-24L.D. #: 2232 Title: _____

Name (PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY)	Town/Affiliation	Proponent	Opponent	Neither	Written Testimony Provided
Cara Brown McCormick	Cape Eliz ME	✓			
Lawrence Less	Beverly MA	✓			
MAIA COOK	New Haven	✓			
Adam Cote	Springvale	✓			
Ride Bennett	Oxford	✓			
Jack McCormick	Cape Elizabeth	✓			
Kade Knay	Portland			✓	
Will Hayward	MCGE			✓	

TESTIMONY SIGN IN SHEET

Richard A. Bennett
Senator, District 18



3 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333

THE MAINE SENATE
131st Legislature

**Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs on
LD 2232, An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make
Independent Expenditures
March 6, 2024**

Senator Hickman, Representative Supica, and esteemed members of the Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs: I am Senator Rick Bennett of Oxford, and I have the honor of serving 14 communities in Western Maine in the State Senate. I am pleased to speak in favor of LD 2232, "An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures."

Our politics is broken. Our government is corrupted by money and large donors. The nation we love is imperiled. Profound changes are needed. LD 2232 could provide one of the solutions to save our country.

As you know from my work on earlier bills before your committee, I am very passionate about reforming our campaign finance system. There are serious issues with money's influence on our democracy. I worry that a small number of people have too much influence on our politics.

The bill before you comes from the people of Maine who overwhelmingly agree with this sentiment. Indeed, 76,081 Mainers have petitioned their legislature to ask us for action. And act we must.

Voters are tired of the incredible amounts of spending done during election season, increasingly by dark money sources. Maine voters continue to support Clean Elections, which is an attempt to get big money out of our politics. However, despite our Clean Election laws, political action committees are allowed to spend unlimited amounts in support or against Clean Election candidates.

People are fed up and motivated to fix this problem. The petition to get this proposal before you began circulating at the end of last October. It took a mere three months for advocates to collect and turn in 76,081 valid signatures from across the state. The people of Maine deserve and want a political system both free of corruption and the appearance of corruption.

Furthermore, this proposal is popular. According to an October 2023 Pew Research Center, 72% of US adults believe that there should be limits on the amount of money individuals and organizations can spend on political campaigns. Only 11% believe individuals and organizations should be able to spend as much as they want and 16% are unsure. Additionally, 80% of US adults believe people who donate money to political campaigns have too much influence on decisions their elected officials make.

The Legislature should enact this law now. It is one of the best changes we can make to improve the accessibility of our democracy. I have no doubt there will be legal challenges after its enactment – there always are by the monied interests eagerly protecting their entrenched power. But I am confident that we will win that legal battle. Harvard Law School’s Lawrence Lessig, who has been spearheading this effort, said, “SuperPACs have been with us for more than 13 years so it is understandable that most lawyers believe the Supreme Court has upheld them. It has not. Likewise, it is understandable that many political organizations, including reform organizations on the Left and Right, have become dependent on the super-wealthy to do their work. Some of them now support SuperPACs, as do many of the most wealthy in America who use SuperPACs to influence American politics. But we know that the vast majority of Americans on both the Left and Right hate the corruption of big money in American politics.”

Thank you for your time. I urge you to vote “ought to pass” on LD 2232 to give citizens the chance to get our democracy back.

Report on Contributions to Super PACs Making Independent Expenditures in Maine *Federal* Elections

Prepared by Maia Cook for the Public Hearing on LD2232:

*An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action
Committees That Make Independent Expenditures*

March 6, 2024

Report on Contributions to Super PACs Making Independent Expenditures in Maine *Federal* Elections

Prepared by Maia Cook

March 6, 2024

Facts about the dataset

- The dataset used for this analysis was received from OpenSecrets
- This dataset only looks at contributions greater than or equal to \$5,000.
- This dataset look at Maine elections from 2010-2022.
- This dataset looks exclusively at Super PACs. It does not account for hybrid independent-expenditure-only groups, otherwise known as 'Carey Committees.'
- This analysis concerns unlimited contributions to committees that make independent expenditures, not the spending of these PACs.

Conclusions from the analysis

1. Independent money is playing an increasingly important role in modern elections.
2. The vast majority of independent money is out-of-state money.
3. Candidates are increasingly dependent on money from super PACs.

Responses to anticipated FAQs:

- Our analysis, and subsequent argument in favor of the proposed initiative, has *nothing* to do with limiting independent expenditures.
- It would be a mistake to infer that our argument opposes *Citizens United v. FEC*. We embrace the logic of *Citizens United v. FEC* to prove that contributions to super PACs should have limits *because* there is a risk of quid pro quo corruption.
- We are not challenging the First Amendment.

FEDERAL REPORT

1 Summary Statistics of *Federal* Dataset

Table 1: Number of Contributions over \$5,000 to Super PACs per ME Cycle

Year	# Contributions
2010	149
2012	244
2014	1318
2016	775
2018	1922
2020	7143
2022	417

Table 2: Total Contributions to Super PACs per ME Cycle

Cycle	ContribTotal
2010	\$4,919,000
2012	\$21,162,880
2014	\$192,267,915
2016	\$148,501,150
2018	\$399,825,729
2020	\$1,478,892,397
2022	\$58,565,122

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Contributions (\$5,000+) Spent in ME Federal Elections, 2010-2022

Statistic	Value
Minimum	\$5,000
1st Quartile	\$5,000
Median	\$20,000
Mean	\$192,525
3rd Quartile	\$100,000
Maximum	\$27,500,000

FEDERAL REPORT




Figure 1: Density Plot of the 95th Percentile of Contribution Sizes

Note: I took the 95th percentile because the plot is illegible when massive outliers in the top 5% of contributions were included.




Figure 2: Time Series Analysis of Contributions from super PACs in Maine Federal Elections

FEDERAL REPORT

2 Top 25 Contributors to Super PACs Spending in Maine Elections (2010-2022)

Table 4: Top 25 Contributors to Super PACs Spending in Maine Elections (2010-2022)

Rank	Contributor	Total Contributions
1	STEYER, THOMAS F	\$113,860,431
2	ADELSON, MIRIAM	\$98,750,000
3	ONE NATION	\$85,065,000
4	Senate Leadership Fund	\$80,170,000
5	ADELSON, SHELDON	\$68,750,000
6	AMERICAN ACTION NETWORK	\$57,716,526
7	MAJORITY FORWARD	\$53,323,000
8	MELLON, TIMOTHY	\$50,000,000
9	ADELSON, SHELDON G	\$40,000,000
10	GRIFFIN, KENNETH C	\$38,000,000
11	SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN A	\$32,950,000
12	YASS, JEFF	\$32,068,000
13	NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS	\$30,603,098
14	UIHLEIN, RICHARD	\$27,500,000
15	EYCHANER, FRED	\$27,000,000
16	SIXTEEN THIRTY FUND	\$25,998,410
17	Working for Working Americans	\$24,015,000
18	NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION	\$23,814,149
19	AMERICA VOTES	\$21,826,500
20	LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, INC	\$21,550,000
21	SUSSMAN, S DONALD	\$21,525,000
22	Democracy PAC	\$19,215,908
23	BLOOMBERG, MICHAEL	\$18,750,000
24	DUTY AND HONOR	\$15,900,000
25	NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION	\$15,000,000

FEDERAL REPORT

3 Top 25 Super PACs making the Largest Independent Expenditures, (2010:2022))

Table 5: Top PACs by Total Independent Expenditures (2010-2022)

Rank	PAC	Total
1	Senate Majority PAC	\$27,907,444
2	Senate Leadership Fund	\$12,614,118
3	Congressional Leadership Fund	\$12,489,281
4	1820 PAC	\$10,387,507
5	House Majority PAC	\$8,321,477
6	Women Vote!	\$4,789,414
7	Family Friendly Action PAC	\$3,571,573
8	Maine Way PAC	\$3,550,404
9	Priorities USA Action	\$3,215,025
10	American Crossroads	\$2,207,856
11	National Assn of Realtors Congressional Fund	\$2,104,568
12	LCV Victory Fund	\$1,955,231
13	VoteVets.org	\$1,867,755
14	With Honor Fund	\$1,748,351
15	Planned Parenthood Votes	\$1,680,005
16	The Lincoln Project	\$1,675,944
17	Maine Liberty PAC	\$1,432,726
18	Change Now PAC	\$1,219,705
19	America First Action	\$1,089,171
20	Patients for Affordable Drugs Action	\$1,072,839
21	Future Forward USA	\$1,067,663
22	Club for Growth Action	\$841,713
23	Moderate PAC	\$749,160
24	Protect Freedom PAC	\$737,021
25	NEA Advocacy Fund	\$645,331

Note: *Total* refers to the total independent expenditures made by super PACs from 2010-2022. This is not looking at the total contributions to PACs from individuals, organizations, corporations, or labor unions. Verify this from Andrew

FEDERAL REPORT

4 In vs Out-of-State Contributions

Table 6: Summary of Contribution Totals (2010-2022)

State	Total	Pct
In	\$7,116,000	0.003
Out	\$2,006,706,545	0.870
Unknown	\$290,311,648	0.125
Grand Total	\$2,304,134,193	1.000


Table 7: Contributions to Super PACs per Cycle

Cycle	Total Contributions	Pct OutState
2010	\$4,919,000	0.712
2012	\$21,162,880	0.977
2014	\$192,267,915	0.908
2016	\$148,501,150	0.872
2018	\$399,825,729	0.888
2020	\$1,478,892,397	0.868
2022	\$58,565,122	0.693
Total	\$2,302,134,193	-

Note: The discrepancy in the Grand Total values between Table 6 and Table 7 can be explained by the fact that 9% of the data was not available for Table 7's out-of-state analysis.

FEDERAL REPORT

Summary of Contribution Totals (2010-2022)



FEDERAL REPORT

Table 8: Contribution Totals per State, 2010-2022

Rank	State	Contrib Total
1	DC	\$355,863,470
2	CA	\$318,798,954
3	NA	\$288,726,648
4	NV	\$235,300,719
5	NY	\$232,291,112
6	IL	\$177,609,710
7	VA	\$96,455,347
8	FL	\$94,187,692
9	TX	\$74,213,326
10	MA	\$61,917,900
11	WY	\$51,984,776
12	PA	\$39,909,359
13	WA	\$35,943,642
14	CO	\$22,830,503
15	AR	\$22,725,000
16	IN	\$21,861,201
17	GA	\$17,717,165
18	CT	\$16,976,197
19	TN	\$15,296,808
20	NJ	\$15,252,324
21	MD	\$15,156,965
22	OH	\$14,882,068
23	MI	\$12,363,036
24	NC	\$8,934,533
25	OK	\$8,812,660
26	ME	\$7,116,000
27	NE	\$4,157,500
28	KS	\$4,130,600
29	WI	\$3,592,519
30	AL	\$3,181,900
31	MO	\$2,806,050
32	ID	\$2,796,997
33	AZ	\$2,223,499
34	NM	\$2,083,000
35	KY	\$1,804,598
36	LA	\$1,637,000
37	NULL	\$1,585,000
38	UT	\$1,460,000
39	MN	\$1,435,214
40	DE	\$1,328,800
41	NH	\$1,170,000
42	SC	\$1,070,600
43	OR	\$1,045,100
44	MS	\$695,000
45	VT	\$490,000
46	HI	\$474,000
47	IA	\$430,000
48	SD	\$287,500
49	RI	\$267,943
50	WV	\$259,500
51	MT	\$171,000
52	ND	\$145,000
53	AK	\$143,758

FEDERAL REPORT

5 Time Series Analysis of Contributions per State




Figure 3: Time series of Maine IN STATE Contributions (> 5k)

FEDERAL REPORT




Figure 4: Time Series of OUT-OF-STATE Contributions (> 5k) from DC

Note: The large amount of contributions coming from DC can be explained by the fact that a lot of super PAC groups are headquartered in Washington, DC.

FEDERAL REPORT

6 Contributions to Super PACs Organized by Partisanship

Note: The following categorizations were made by a team of researchers at OpenSecrets, the nation’s premier research and government transparency group tracking money in politics and its effect on elections and policy.

Note: I do not have a codebook on this dataset, but I infer that viewpt = X means that OpenSecrets was unable to place the Super PAC into strictly binary partisan categories.




Figure 5: Enter Caption

Table 9: Contributions Organized by Partisanship

Cycle	Pct Consv	Pct Libl	Pct Other	Election Total
2010	0.10	0.90	NA	\$4,919,000
2012	0.87	0.10	0.02	\$21,162,880
2014	0.11	0.89	NA	\$192,267,915
2016	0.35	0.65	NA	\$148,501,150
2018	0.47	0.43	0.01	\$399,825,729
2020	0.54	0.44	0.02	\$1,478,892,397
2022	0.30	0.60	0.11	\$58,565,122
Grand Total				\$2,304,133,193

FEDERAL REPORT

Supplementary Materials

(1) Information about Super PACs

(1.1) Routes Contributions take to get to Super PACs

Individual → 501(c)(4) → Super PAC
 Individual → Super PAC
 Corporate Treasury → 501(c)(4) → Super PAC
 Union Treasury → 501(c)(4) → Super PAC
 Corporate Treasury → Super PAC
 Union Treasury → Super PAC
 Super PAC → Super PAC
 Ordinary PAC → Super PAC
 Super PAC ⇌ Campaign Committee

(1.2) Differences between Super PACs and Ordinary PACs (at the federal level)

Super PACs	Ordinary PACs
Super PACs cannot give directly to campaign committees. Coordination is legally prohibited.	Ordinary PACs can give directly to campaign committees. Coordination is legally permissible.
Super PACs have <i>no limits</i> on how much they can receive from a contributor.	Ordinary PACs are <i>limited</i> in how much they can receive from a contributor.
Super PACs can receive contributions from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Individuals - Corporate Treasuries - Union Treasuries - 501(c)(4)s - Other Super PACs - Ordinary PACs 	PACs can receive contributions from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Individuals PACs cannot receive contributions from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corporate Treasuries - Union Treasuries

FEDERAL REPORT

(1.3) *Contributions* vs *Expenditures*

Contribution → **Super PAC** → Independent Expenditures
Contribution → **PAC** → Expenditures

A Note on Contributions vs Expenditures:

- *Independent Expenditures*, at the federal level, refers to uncoordinated election spending by super PACs.
- *Contributions*, in this analysis, refers to the contributions made by individuals, organizations, corporations, or unions to super PACs. Our argument in favor of LD2232 concerns contributions, not independent expenditures.
- See 1.2 (above) for an idea of what kinds of paths exist to get contributions to super PACs.

Report on Contributions to PACs Making Independent Expenditures in Maine *State* Elections

Prepared by Maia Cook for the Public Hearing on LD2232:

*An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action
Committees That Make Independent Expenditures*

March 6, 2024

Report on Contributions to PACs Making Independent Expenditures in Maine *State* Elections

Prepared by Maia Cook

March 6, 2024

Facts about the dataset

- This data was pulled from OpenSecrets' sister website: FollowtheMoney.
- This data looks at all contributions greater than or equal to \$5,000 – with the exception of the out-of-state section of this report, which will also look at all contributions less than or equal to \$5,000.
- This data looks at contributions Maine state elections from 2010-2022.

STATE REPORT

1 Summary Statistics of *State* Dataset

Table 1: Number of Contributions > \$5,000 per Cycle

Cycle	Contributions
2010	125
2011	70
2012	188
2014	361
2016	504
2017	37
2018	255
2020	181
2022	336

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Contributions > \$5,000 (2010:2022)

Statistic	Value
Min.	\$5,011
1st Qu.	\$10,000
Median	\$20,000
Mean	\$59,111
3rd Qu.	\$50,000
Max.	\$1,700,000

STATE REPORT

Time Series: Contributions to Maine Elections




Figure 1: Time Series of IN & OUT-OF-STATE Contributions to Independent Expenditure PACs (2010-2022)

STATE REPORT

2 Total Contributions by Party and ME Election Year

Table 3: Total of *Expressly* Partisan Contributions per ME Election

Election	Total Democrat/Lib	Total Republican/Cons
2010	\$1,899,594.9	\$1,215,793.8
2011	\$382,961.8	\$571,428.3
2012	\$3,295,910.7	\$2,387,474.6
2014	\$8,594,919.8	\$7,366,530.9
2016	\$4,965,765.7	\$1,598,969.1
2018	\$6,729,388.6	\$3,733,076.2
2020	\$3,838,206.0	\$1,424,869.3
2022	\$6,581,644.8	\$8,458,433.2
Grand Total	\$36,388,392.3	\$26,756,575.4

Total Contributions by Party per Election Year




Figure 2: Total Contributions by Party and ME Election Year

STATE REPORT

3 Top 25 Largest Contributors to Independent Expenditure Groups (2010:2022)

Table 4: Largest Contributors to Independent Expenditure Groups, (2010:2022)

Rank	CFS Entity	Total Contributions
1	DEMOCRATIC GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION	\$16,750,095
2	REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION	\$15,373,742
3	SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN CMTE OF MAINE	\$8,582,601
4	NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION	\$5,340,483
5	HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN CMTE OF MAINE	\$4,590,813
6	EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY	\$4,372,908
7	SCOTT, LISA	\$4,058,965
8	DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN CMTE	\$3,445,571
9	LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS	\$3,385,000
10	KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS	\$3,045,000
11	NEXTGEN CLIMATE ACTION	\$2,795,550
12	NEW APPROACH PAC	\$2,407,372
13	MAINE SENATE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY	\$2,156,359
14	REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP CMTE	\$2,144,500
15	SUSSMAN, SELWYN DONALD (S D)	\$2,076,188
16	NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION / NRA	\$2,031,551
17	MAINE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION	\$1,612,105
18	UNITEMIZED DONATIONS	\$1,143,388
19	MAINE PEOPLES ALLIANCE	\$1,113,354
20	EMILYS LIST	\$1,093,000
21	PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA	\$1,031,408
22	CITIZENS WHO SUPPORT MAINES PUBLIC SCHOOLS	\$886,900
23	SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION / SEIU	\$880,000
24	BLANK	\$850,000
25	MAINE REPUBLICAN PARTY	\$789,532


STATE REPORT

4 In vs Out-of-State Contributions: Maine State Elections

Table 5: In vs Out-of-State Contribution Totals for Contributions OVER \$5,000 (2010-2022)

State	Total	Pct
Out	\$82,386,338	67.7%
In	\$38,142,719	31.3%
Unknown	\$1,062,009	0.08%
Grand Total	\$121,591,066	100.0%

Out-of-State Contributions (Over \$5000)




STATE REPORT

Table 6: In vs Out-of-State Contribution Totals for Contributions UNDER \$5,000 (2010-2022)

State	Total	Pct
Out	\$4,057,295.00	27.7%
In	\$10,517,740.00	71.8%
Unknown	\$54,196.13	0.3%
Grand Total	\$14,629,231.13	100.0%

Out-of-State Contributions (Under \$5000)



Based on an analysis in R, we account for more observations by measuring state using an indicator variable from the dataset called CFS.InState instead of a variable called SAT.State.

STATE REPORT

Table 7: Number of Out-of-State Contributions > \$5,000, 2010-2022

State	Count
DC	467
ME	1154
NY	84
FL	43
<i>NULL</i>	49
PA	38
MD	26
CA	28
VA	34
CT	7
GA	7
IL	9
MA	12
NC	12
OH	12
NH	16
CO	18
MN	2
TN	2
VT	2
WA	4
KS	4
KY	4
MO	4
TX	11
AZ	2
WI	1
RI	1
NJ	1
OK	1
AK	1
AR	1

STATE REPORT

Table 8: Contribution Totals by State (2010-2022)

Rank	Contrib.State	Total
1	DC	\$57,479,818.71
2	ME	\$36,668,032.49
3	NY	\$9,690,322.18
4	FL	\$4,670,275.64
5	VA	\$3,285,813.78
6	PA	\$2,115,032.54
7	<i>NULL</i>	\$2,051,033.25
8	CO	\$1,089,000.00
9	MD	\$724,235.44
10	NC	\$698,500.00
11	TX	\$545,000.00
12	CA	\$484,075.57
13	MA	\$408,000.00
14	NH	\$315,000.00
15	IL	\$276,006.28
16	WA	\$233,000.00
17	GA	\$214,999.00
18	AZ	\$125,000.00
19	CT	\$104,000.00
20	OH	\$84,500.00
21	KS	\$74,500.00
22	MN	\$46,920.55
23	MO	\$41,000.00
24	KY	\$40,000.00
25	VT	\$37,500.00
26	WI	\$25,500.00
27	TN	\$15,500.00
28	OK	\$15,300.00
29	AK	\$10,000.00
30	AR	\$10,000.00
31	RI	\$6,700.00
32	NJ	\$6,500.00

STATE REPORT




Figure 3: Time Series Plot of IN STATE Contributions (> 5k)

Note: The large amount of contributions coming from DC can be explained by the fact that a lot of super PAC groups are headquartered in Washington, DC.

STATE REPORT




Figure 4: Time Series Plot of DC Contributions (> 5k) to ME Elections

5 Contributions by Industry




Figure 5: Total Contributions to Independent Expenditure PACs per Industry in ME elections (2010:2022)

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Analyses of contributions by industry are not available for election cycles before 2016.

Table 9: Ranked Industry Contributions in 2016 ME Election Cycle

Rank	Business	Total Industry
1	Gun Control	\$5,693,750.20
2	Democratic Party committees	\$3,708,329.04
3	Drug Legalization Advocates	\$3,104,632.28
4	Public School Advocates	\$2,977,302.08
5	Uncoded	\$2,178,637.03
6	Gun Rights	\$2,071,015.93
7	Other single-issue or ideological groups	\$1,714,474.99
8	Republican Party committees	\$1,538,969.15
9	Democratic/Liberal	\$1,257,436.66
10	Abortion policy, pro-choice	\$186,054.18
11	Real estate	\$82,903.98
12	Environmental policy	\$66,000.00
13	Republican/Conservative	\$60,000.00
14	Trucking	\$25,560.00
15	Hunting & wildlife	\$10,000.00
16	Restaurants & drinking establishments	\$7,500.00
Grand Total		\$24,447,615.92

Table 10: Ranked Industry Contributions in 2018 ME Election Cycle

Rank	Business	Total Industry
1	Uncoded	\$5,993,414.20
2	Democratic Party committees	\$4,610,648.40
3	Republican Party committees	\$3,733,076.20
4	Democratic/Liberal	\$2,118,740.20
5	Environmental policy	\$1,540,000.00
6	Abortion policy, pro-choice	\$258,000.00
7	Real estate	\$57,450.00
8	Gun Rights	\$30,007.90
Grand Total		\$17,341,337.90

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Table 11: Ranked Industry Contributions in 2020 ME Election Cycle

Rank	Business	Total Industry
1	Democratic Party committees	\$3,313,127.50
2	Republican Party committees	\$1,424,869.30
3	Public School Advocates	\$671,000.00
4	Democratic/Liberal	\$525,078.60
5	Uncoded	\$464,375.10
6	Abortion policy, pro-choice	\$355,295.00
7	Health & welfare policy	\$103,704.00
8	Environmental policy	\$45,000.00
Grand Total		\$6,902,449.50

Table 12: Ranked Industry Contributions in 2022 ME Election Cycle

Rank	Business	Total Industry
1	Uncoded	\$14,825,767.50
2	Republican Party committees	\$8,458,433.20
3	Democratic Party committees	\$5,680,844.80
4	Environmental policy	\$1,065,514.90
5	Democratic/Liberal	\$900,799.90
6	Abortion policy, pro-choice	\$895,500.00
7	Public School Advocates	\$729,000.00
8	Term limits	\$156,160.40
9	Gun Rights	\$35,887.50
Grand Total		\$32,647,798.20

**TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE
ON VETERANS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
IN SUPPORT OF
LD 2232**

**“AN ACT TO LIMIT CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
THAT MAKE INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES”**

Good afternoon, Senator Hickman, Representative Supica and distinguished members of the Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs. My name is Adam Cote, I am an attorney at Drummond Woodsum. I am here to testify in favor of LD 2232, “An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures.”

I have been working with Professor Larry Lessig and his organization, Equal Citizens, and Cara McCormick’s Ballot Question Committee, Citizens to End SuperPACs to get this issue before Maine voters as a referendum in the November election.

As an attorney, I find this bill fascinating because although, from a drafting perspective, it is remarkably simple – limiting to \$5,000 per year the amount of contributions by individuals, PACs and businesses to PACs that make independent expenditures – yet this simple bill effectively works to challenge the lower courts’ interpretation to the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Buckley v Valeo* and *Citizen’s United*.

As a former candidate for statewide office, I find this bill enormously important to help limit the disproportionate role single donors have in our election process. This is an issue I dealt with in the most personal of ways having spent the better part of two years trying to raise campaign funds with a \$1,600 per donor limit only to have a SuperPAC formed two weeks before the primary election to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars against my campaign.

But the biggest reason I am supportive of this initiative is because I am a citizen of the State and great country and like many of you, I am concerned about our democracy. Democracies are very fragile and, in our country, today – regardless of your political beliefs – I think you can acknowledge that wealthy donors contributing to SuperPACs is one of the most corrupting and truly undemocratic forces that enjoys a grossly disproportionate share of influence over our election process. While this bill does not solve all of those problems, I believe it is a large step forward. And as a final point, I think that this November's election could likely be the most divisive one in our country's history – which is saying a lot. I kind of like the idea of having Mainers going to the polls this November with at least one unifying issue they can all agree upon.

I would be happy to answer any of your questions.



Senator Craig Hickman, Senate Chair
Representative Laura Supica, House Chair
Committee on Veterans & Legal Affairs
Maine State Legislature

RE: IB 5, LD 2232 (An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees
That Make Independent Expenditures)

March 5, 2024

Dear Chair Hickman and Chair Supica,

I am the Legal Director of Free Speech For People, a national non-partisan non-profit organization that works to renew our democracy and to limit the influence of money in our elections. I write in support of LD 2232, which will limiting contributions to independent expenditure PACs, more commonly known as “super PACs.”

Super PACs are political committees that make only “independent” expenditures. Under current law, there are absolutely no limits on contributions to these committees. This creates some unfortunate, illogical, and harmful effects. For example, it is illegal for a wealthy donor to contribute a penny more than \$1,950 to a candidate for governor, because the legislature has determined that contributions above that amount pose an unacceptable risk of corruption or the appearance of corruption.¹ Yet that same wealthy donor may contribute \$100,000, or \$1 million, if not \$10 million, to the candidate’s super PAC. As just one example, in 2022, a super PAC funded by a single donor spent some \$300,000 on the primary in the Cumberland County district attorney’s race—four times as much as the total raised by both candidates combined.²

This bill amends Title 21-A to impose a contribution limit of \$5,000 from any individual or other PAC to a super PAC. This is two-and-a-half times the limit on contributions to gubernatorial candidates, and over ten times the limit on contributions to legislative candidates. It is more than enough to enable contributors to support their favored candidates without posing an unacceptable risk of corruption.

¹ Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 21-A, § 1015.

² See David Sharp, *National groups flooding local prosecutor races with money*, NewsCenter Maine, <https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/nation-world/local-prosecutor-races-get-national-funding/507-5a575486-fff2-469c-b4ca-8f4c65172638> (June 10, 2022).

Some believe that U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including the 2010 *Citizens United* decision, ban limits on contributions to independent expenditure PACs. But that is incorrect. While some federal courts of appeals in other parts of the country, have interpreted *Citizens United* to require this result,³ as explained in detail below, the reasoning of those decisions is incorrect. In any event, no court with jurisdiction over Maine—neither in the state court system nor any federal court—has ever adopted the reasoning of those courts or otherwise indicated that limits on contributions to super PACs would be unconstitutional.

And since 2010, empirical evidence has mounted against the assumptions underlying that decision. For example, as explained in more detail in two reports by political scientist Stephen Weissman,⁴ the actual relationships between “independent” super PACs and their large donors provides ample opportunities for quid pro quo corruption.⁵ Recent empirical research shows that, as one might expect, this also leads to the *appearance* of corruption.⁶

LD 2332 would help increase the integrity of Maine’s elections by banning deep-pocketed donors from contributing unlimited amounts to super PACs, thus reducing

³ See, e.g., *SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 599 F.3d 686 (2010).

⁴ See Stephen R. Weissman, *The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign Finance* (Oct. 2016), available at <https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FSFP-Weissman-Report-final-10-24-16.pdf>; Stephen R. Weissman, *The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign Finance: Undermining Federal Limits on Contributions to Political Parties (Part II)* (May 2017), available at https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Research-Report-2017_01.pdf.

⁵ Indeed, a federal grand jury indicted a sitting U.S. Senator for bribery for a contribution to a super PAC, and a federal judge upheld the indictment as consistent with *Citizens United*, although the jury later deadlocked and the judge dismissed some of the charges for insufficient evidence. See *United States v. Menendez*, No. CR 15-155, 2018 WL 526746, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2018). Relatedly, in 2011 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a bribery conviction against Alabama Governor Don Siegelman where the bribe in question was given to a charitable organization that engaged only in issue advocacy. See *United States v. Siegelman*, 640 F.3d 1159, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). The fact that a federal court found quid pro quo corruption from a contribution to a group that spent only on issue advocacy is striking because courts consider issue advocacy to pose no greater (and probably less) risk of corruption than “independent” expenditures in candidate races.

⁶ See Christopher Robertson et al., *The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation*, 8 *Journal of Legal Analysis* 375 (Winter 2016), available at <https://academic.oup.com/jla/article/8/2/375/2502553>.

the risk of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. The remainder of this memorandum provides a detailed legal explanation why the U.S. Supreme Court's campaign finance precedent does not block Maine from protecting its elections in this way.

Thank you for considering LD2332 and I would be happy to discuss it further at your convenience.

Sincerely,
Ron Fein, Legal Director
Free Speech For People
617-244-0234
rfein@freespeechforpeople.org

I. Limits on contributions to candidates and closely affiliated political actors, including super PACs, are constitutional means of preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.

1. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, campaign finance limits must serve “the prevention of ‘*quid pro quo*’ corruption or its appearance.” *FEC v. Cruz*, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1652 (2022). But the Court has long held that restrictions on contributions are different in kind from expenditure limits and accordingly are subject to a more deferential constitutional scrutiny.

Expenditure limitations directly restrict communication and are therefore subject to “exacting scrutiny.” *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 44-48 (1976). But contribution limits are “merely marginal speech restrictions” that “lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression.” *FEC v. Beaumont*, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A contribution serves only “as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views.” *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 21. It “does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.” *Id.* “[T]he transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” *Id.* A contribution limit thus moderates only “the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution.” *McCutcheon v. FEC*, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 21).⁷ It does “not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” *Id.* (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 21).

Thus, contribution limits are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than expenditure limits. *Id.* at 196-97. Contribution limits are valid when “closely drawn” to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. *See id.* at 197-98, 207-08; *Buckley*, 424

⁷ All subsequent citations to *McCutcheon* are to the plurality opinion unless otherwise noted.

U.S. at 25-29. This “relatively complaisant” test, *Beaumont*, 539 U.S. at 161, does not permit the public to limit “mere influence or access” to political officials, *McCutcheon*, 572 U.S. at 208. But the public may permissibly limit “the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions’ to particular candidates.” *Id.* at 207 (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 27).

2. Consequently, the Supreme Court has “routinely struck down limitations on independent expenditures by candidates, other individuals, and groups, while repeatedly upholding contribution limits.” *FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.* (“*Colorado II*”), 533 U.S. 431, 441-42 (2001) (citations omitted). Especially relevant here, the Court has repeatedly upheld statutes limiting the amount of money people may contribute to candidates or third parties with close ties to particular candidates.

First, in *Buckley*, the Court upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) limits on contributions directly to candidates. 424 U.S. at 28-29. Candidates, the Supreme Court explained, “depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign.” *Id.* at 26. Absent regulation, therefore, large contributions might be given “to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.” *Id.* “[T]he opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” would also create an “appearance of corruption” that could erode “confidence in the system of representative Government.” *Id.* at 27 (citation omitted).

In *California Medical Association v. FEC*, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (“*CalMed*”), the Court applied *Buckley*’s rationale and upheld a limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees that, *inter alia*, made independent expenditures. *Id.* at 184-85. Without these limits, the restrictions on contributions to candidates themselves “could be easily evaded” simply “by channelling funds through a multicandidate political committee.” *Id.* at 198 (plurality opinion). Thus, capping contributions to outside groups is “an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in *Buckley*.” *Id.* at 199.

In *McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the Court similarly applied *Buckley*’s rationale to uphold limits on donations of “soft money”—contributions to national, state, and local political parties for activities that included issue advertising. *Id.* at 122-24, 131, 168. Even assuming that money was not spent in coordination with particular candidates, *see id.* at 152 & 152 n.48, the Court recognized that soft-money contributions “create[d] a significant risk of actual and apparent corruption,” *id.* at 168. “[O]fficeholders were well aware of the identities of the donors” who contributed large amounts of soft money to parties. *Id.* at 147. And given the “close

ties” between parties and the parties’ candidates, *id.* at 161, the activities funded by soft money “confer[red] substantial benefits on federal candidates,” *id.* at 168. Parties, therefore, could serve as “intermediaries” between big donors seeking “to create debt on the part of officeholders” and candidates seeking “to increase their prospects of election.” *Id.* at 146.

3. The Supreme Court’s cases since 2010, including *Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), are in accord. In *Citizens United*, the Court invalidated a federal statute that forbade corporations from making political *expenditures* close to elections. *Id.* at 318-19. Reiterating that expenditures are “political speech,” and that “[t]he First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office,” the Court reasoned that “[t]he anticorruption interest is not sufficient” to restrict such expenditures. *Id.* at 339-40, 357 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]ndependent expenditures,” the Court further stated, “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” *Id.* at 357. At the same time, the Court emphasized that it had “sustained limits on direct *contributions* in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption.” *Id.* at 357 (emphasis added); *see also id.* at 345, 361 (stressing that *Citizens United* dealt only with expenditures).

After *Citizens United*, the Court again recognized that “Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption.” *McCutcheon*, 572 U.S. at 191. In *McCutcheon*, the Court invalidated a statute limiting *aggregate* candidate contributions. *Id.* at 193, 221. But it reiterated *Buckley*’s holding that FECA’s “base” limits themselves “serv[e] the permissible objective of combatting corruption.” *Id.* at 192-93; *see also id.* at 197-98. The Court also stressed that “*McConnell*’s holding about ‘soft money’” was unaffected by its ruling. *Id.* at 209 n.6.

Crucially, the Court in recent years has twice summarily reaffirmed FECA’s restrictions on soft money contributions, ***even where the recipients of the prospective donations sought to spend the money independently—i.e., without coordinating with a candidate or campaign.*** *See Republican Party of La. v. FEC*, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2016), *aff’d*, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017); *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC*, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D.D.C. 2010), *aff’d*, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). In the second of those cases, the Solicitor General’s 2017 filing stressed “the distinction between expenditure limits and contribution limits” and agreed that Congress may limit soft-money *contributions* that political parties intend to use exclusively for independent *expenditures*. Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm at 18-22, *Republican Party of La. v. FEC*, 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017) (No. 16-865), 2017 WL 1352870, at *18, *22. Only two Justices would have set the case for argument. *Republican Party of La.*, 137 S. Ct. at 2178.

Finally, nothing in the Court's most recent campaign finance decision, *FEC v. Cruz*, 142 S. Ct. 1638 (2022), alters this framework.

II. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's view, *Citizens United* does not prohibit limits on contributions to independent expenditure groups.

In *SpeechNow.org v. FEC*, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), the D.C. Circuit asserted that *Citizens United* dictates, "as a matter of law," that contributions to committees that make only independent expenditures cannot be limited. *Id.* at 695. The court of appeals reasoned: "[B]ecause *Citizens United* holds that independent expenditures do not corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law, then the government can have no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only organizations." *Id.* at 696.

But *SpeechNow's* reasoning is fallacious. ***Even when an organization's spending does not corrupt, a contribution to that organization can still corrupt.***

1. Bribery law makes clear that donations to actors other than candidates or organizations under their control can give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Even when the recipient of a donation is independent and incorruptible, the donation can corrupt an actor who is interested in seeing the organization funded and successful—and who may be willing to grant favors in return.

Bribery laws incorporate that commonsense insight. Because a payment can corrupt even when it is directed to an entity the bribed official does not control, the federal bribery statute forbids a public official from corruptly seeking "anything of value personally or for any other person or entity" in exchange for official action. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (emphasis added); see, e.g., *United States v. Brewster*, 506 F.2d 62, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasizing the import of the "any other person or entity" coverage).

For instance, a senator "who agreed to vote in favor of widget subsidies in exchange for a widget maker's donation to the Red Cross" would be guilty of bribery even if he had no connection to the Red Cross or role in determining how the organization spent the funds. Albert W. Alschuler et al., *Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACs Should Survive Citizens United*, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 2299, 2310 (2018). Even though the Red Cross's expenditures would be virtuous, the widget maker's contribution would be corrupt. *Id.*

Bribery through corrupt donations to autonomous third-party entities themselves engaged in non-corrupting spending is not merely a hypothetical concern. Affirming the conviction of a former governor, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that soliciting a donation to an issue-advocacy foundation—which engages solely in non-corrupting issue advocacy speech—can violate the bribery

statute, even though donations to such organizations “do not financially benefit the individual politician in the same way that a candidate-election campaign contribution does.” *United States v. Siegelman*, 640 F.3d 1159, 1169 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011); *see also, e.g., United States v. Gross*, No. 15-cr-769, 2017 WL 4685111, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2017) (bribery through donation to a church).

2. In *Citizens United*, the Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a *quid pro quo* for improper commitments from the candidate.” 558 U.S. at 357 (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 47). It then further stated that “independent expenditures . . . *do not* give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

That statement arose in the context of independent expenditures. In that context, the *spender*—the person(s) involved in selecting, e.g., where to buy TV ads, or how to frame a message about the opponent—is not communicating with the *politician*. But if the *spender* is isolated from the *politician*, then the spender’s independent spending (“quid”) cannot be connected with favors from the politician (“quo”) because they have no opportunity to discuss that exchange (no “pro”).

That, however, says nothing about a donor who contributes to the spender at the request of the politician. Even if a super PAC (the spender) does not coordinate its campaign strategy with a supported candidate, a contributor is free to discuss both the “quid” and the “quo” with the candidate. *See* Albert W. Alschuler, *Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow*, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 389, 475 (2015). Interviews with former Members of Congress and political operatives suggest how such quid pro quo agreements could occur. *See* Daniel B. Tokaji & Renata E.B. Strause, *The New Soft Money: Outside Spending in Congressional Elections* (2014). As one campaign operative explained: “So the Member calls and says ‘Hey, I know you’re maxed out – and I can’t take any more money from you – but there’s this other group. I’m not allowed to coordinate with them, but can I have someone call you?’” *Id.* at 68. The conversation could then discuss official matters, including an agreement to take official action in exchange for the donor’s contributions to the “other group,” *i.e.*, the super PAC.

Put another way, the *spender* (e.g., the media consultant running the super PAC) does not want widget subsidies—the *donor* does. A quid pro quo transaction is thus perfectly plausible: The donor and politician agree that the donor will contribute a large sum to the super PAC in exchange for widget subsidies; the politician agrees; the donor makes the corrupt contribution; and the super PAC—which can be isolated from the widget subsidy conversation—spends the money, *non-corruptly*, to buy independent ads in support of the politician. Thus, the condition described in *Citizens United* is maintained (the independent spending

does not corrupt) but the facile syllogism in *SpeechNow* (that money contributed for the purpose of non-corrupt spending cannot be part of a separate corrupt transaction) is refuted.

In fact, Chief Justice Roberts has refuted the idea that independent spending has no value to candidates—that there is no corrupting “quid.” He explained, “We have said in the context of independent expenditures that ‘[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.’ *But probably not by 95 percent.*” *McCutcheon*, 572 U.S. at 214 (cleaned up; emphasis added; citation omitted). Thus, independent spending *does* have value to candidates. The reason it can’t corrupt is because the independent spender is isolated from the politician and thus has no chance to discuss an exchange. But a super PAC provides a cut-out, leaving the donor and politician free to communicate.

Indeed, the federal government has repeatedly charged individuals with bribery arising from donations to super PACs themselves.⁸ In 2020, the federal government convicted insurance magnate Greg Lindberg of “orchestrating a bribery scheme involving independent expenditure accounts and improper campaign contributions.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Federal Jury Convicts Founder and Chairman of a Multinational Investment Company and a Company Consultant of Public Corruption and Bribery Charges* (Mar. 5, 2020), perma.cc/38BH-JD4V. Lindberg funneled \$1.5 million to a super PAC he created for the purpose of bribing a state insurance commissioner to replace an official investigating Lindberg’s company. Ian Vandewalker, *10 Years of Super PACs Show Courts Were Wrong on Corruption Risks*, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (Mar. 25, 2020), perma.cc/4DJN-DSKT.⁹

⁸ These examples may appear few, but “the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained.” *Citizens United*, 558 U.S. at 356 (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 27). Moreover, *SpeechNow* rested on a syllogistic conclusion that such quid pro quo corruption was logically impossible, so the existence of *any* quid pro quo corrupt transaction via a contribution to a super PAC illustrates its fallacy. *Cf. FEC v. Cruz*, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1653 (2022) (in reviewing a challenge to a different campaign finance statute, noting that “the Government is unable to identify a single case of *quid pro quo* corruption in this context.”)

⁹ Lindberg was caught on tape telling the commissioner, “I think the play here is to create an independent-expenditure committee for your reelection specifically, with the goal of raising \$2 million or something.” Ames Alexander, *Watch Secretly Recorded Videos from the Bribery Sting that Targeted Durham Billionaire*, Charlotte Observer, at 00:16-30 (Mar. 10, 2020), bit.ly/35aPKvV (quotation transcribed from first video posted in article). Lindberg emphasized that “the beauty of” such a committee is that it can receive “unlimited” donations. *Id.* at 00:35-45.

In 2015, the Government prosecuted a sitting U.S. Senator and a donor for an alleged bribery scheme involving a \$300,000 contribution to a super PAC supporting the Senator's reelection. *See United States v. Menendez*, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (D.N.J. 2015). The case resulted in a hung jury, but the court did not question the validity of prosecutors' theory that contributions to super PACs can corrupt.

If the D.C. Circuit were right that "contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption," *SpeechNow*, 599 F.3d at 694, these prosecutions would all have been illegitimate. The quid pro quo corruption the federal government alleged would be impossible. When something theorized to be impossible actually occurs, the theory, not the reality, requires correction.

2. The Supreme Court's campaign finance precedents underscore the impropriety of the D.C. Circuit's leap from the proposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt to the conclusion that *contributions* to independent-expenditure-only organizations cannot corrupt. In *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC* ("*Colorado I*"), 518 U.S. 604 (1996), the Court invalidated limits on independent expenditures by political parties as insufficiently justified by a danger of corruption. *See id.* at 617-18. But the opinion recognized a valid interest in limiting *contributions to the very organizations making those independent expenditures* to fight the "danger of corruption" that would inhere in allowing "large financial contributions [to those organizations] for political favors." *Id.* at 615-17 (opinion of Breyer, J.).

In *McConnell*, the Supreme Court likewise explained that, because of the "close connection and alignment of interests" between officeholders and parties, "large soft-money contributions to national parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal officeholders, *regardless of how those funds are ultimately used.*" 540 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added). And in *Republican Party of Louisiana*, which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed in 2017, 137 S. Ct. 2178, a three-judge federal court recognized that contributions to political parties can corrupt even when the parties' expenditures do not. 219 F. Supp. 3d at 97. Writing for the panel, Judge Srinivasan reasoned that "the inducement occasioning the prospect of indebtedness on the part of a federal officeholder is not the *spending* of soft money by the political party. The inducement instead comes from the *contribution* of soft money to the party in the first place." *Id.*

That logic applies here. It does not matter whether super PACs' *expenditures* present a risk of corruption. The question instead is whether large *contributions* to these organizations risk corruption or the appearance of corruption. *See McCutcheon*, 572 U.S. at 191.

III. Limiting contributions to super PACs is a valid means of preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.

Just like the limits on contributions the Supreme Court upheld in *Buckley* and subsequent cases, limits on contributions to super PACs “protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption.” *Id.*

1. Many super PACs are functionally alter egos of candidates’ campaigns themselves—raising the same prospects of corruption that direct contributions present.¹⁰ This is most obviously true for super PACs that spend the money they receive to promote a single candidate. Many of these super PACs are run by “former staff of candidates who understand what will help the candidate and make expenditures intended to help the candidate, such as funding events about more general issues that feature the candidate.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-20-66R, *Campaign Finance: Federal Framework, Agency Roles and Responsibilities, and Perspectives* 52 (2020). Indeed, such super PACs conduct “a wide array of activities typically the province of the candidates”—including “provid[ing] rapid response to charges against their candidate” and “build[ing] lists of persuadable voters.” Bipartisan Policy Ctr., *Campaign Finance in the United States: Assessing an Era of Fundamental Change* 39 (2018). Candidates also “often openly support and associate with” such organizations, appearing at their fundraising events and the like. *Id.* at 33. Similarly, super PACs that promote multiple candidates of the same party often function as alter egos for parties.

Donor activity with respect to super PACs confirms that limiting contributions to such organizations is necessary to prevent the limits on contributions to candidates from being “functionally meaningless.” Richard Briffault, *Super PACs*, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1684 (2012). A small handful of exceptionally wealthy people not only contribute the maximum permissible amount to candidates; they donate huge amounts of money to super PACs supporting those same candidates.¹¹ And consider the 2021 Boston mayor’s race, where the legal contribution limit (i.e., the threshold at which the legislature has found a risk of corruption) for a contribution

¹⁰ That applies even to relationships that are *permitted* under anti-coordination rules. Under those rules, donors typically still view a contribution to a super PAC as functionally indistinguishable from a contribution to a candidate himself. The real-world practices described herein do not constitute “coordination” under these rules, and there is no reason to believe that these practices fit within the U.S. Supreme Court’s conception of “coordination.” The fundamental issue is not the coordination or lack thereof; it is potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption. Accordingly, the only pathway available to prevent the potential corruption—and obvious appearance of corruption—enabled by super PACs is through contribution limits.

¹¹ See Stephen R. Weissman, *The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign Finance* (Oct. 2016), <https://bit.ly/3MT3FLC>.

to a candidate was \$1,000. *See* M.G.L. ch. 55, § 7A(a)(1). Notwithstanding this \$1,000 limit, one donor (legally) contributed over one *million* dollars to a super PAC that spent 100% of its money supporting a particular candidate.¹² Meanwhile, the super PAC supporting that candidate's opponent received multiple \$50,000 contributions (50 times the limit for a direct contribution) and many just under.¹³

In short, the Supreme Court has held that Maine may prohibit a donor from contributing more than \$1,950 to candidate Smith because larger contributions would risk actual or apparent corruption. But, under the D.C. Circuit's logic, the Constitution confers upon that same donor the constitutional right to give over one *million* to a super PAC that is dedicated exclusively to Smith's election, and to hold a freewheeling conversation with Smith about both the contribution and what Smith can do for the donor in return. According to the D.C. Circuit, Maine cannot restrict such a massive contribution because it does not raise *any risk of corruption at all*. That cannot be right.

2. Finally, large contributions to super PACs present the *appearance* of quid pro quo corruption. Intuitively, if a contribution directly to a candidate of \$1,951 risks the appearance of corruption, then a contribution of \$1,950,000 to that candidate's super PAC risks at least the same appearance of corruption.

Elected officials agree. During the 2016 campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump decried super PACs as “[v]ery corrupt.” Alschuler et al., *supra*, at 2339. Trump continued: “There is total control of the candidates I know it so well because I was on both sides of it” *Id.* Senator Lindsey Graham made a similar observation in 2015, stating that “basically 50 people are running the whole show.” *Id.* at 2341. The late Senator John McCain said that super PACs have “made a contribution limit a joke.” *Id.* Consistent with these comments from elected officials, surveys show that the general public overwhelmingly perceives that unlimited contributions to super PACs “lead to corruption.”¹⁴


¹² See OCPF, 81065 *Real Progress Boston Independent Expenditure Political Action Committee*, <https://m.ocpf.us/Filers/FilerInfo?q=81065>. The donor in question is James Davis.

¹³ See OCPF, 81057 *Boston Turnout Project Independent Expenditure Political Action Committee*, <https://m.ocpf.us/Filers/FilerInfo?q=81057>.

¹⁴ Brennan Ctr. for Justice, *National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy* (Apr. 24, 2012), <https://bit.ly/3NVKt17> (summary and appendix) (noting that 69% of respondents, including broad supermajorities of both Republicans and Democrats, endorsed this proposition). In the same survey, 75% of Republicans and 78% of Democrats agreed specifically that “there would be less corruption if there were limits on how much could be given to Super PACs.” *Id.*

Finally, the aforementioned bribery prosecutions involving super PAC contributions illustrate what these officials openly admit: super PAC contributions can—and do—facilitate quid pro quo arrangements. Of course, bribery prosecutions capture “only the most blatant and specific attempts” to corrupt candidates and public officials. *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 28. But the fact that they have occurred underscores the reasonableness of a judgment that contributions to independent expenditure political committees should be limited to prevent the appearance, as well as actuality, of quid pro quo corruption.

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TO: The Honorable Craig Hickman
The Honorable Laura Supica, Co-Chairs
Members of the Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs

DATE: March 6, 2024

RE: LD 2232 - An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures

Good morning Senator Hickman and Representative Supica.

My name is Will Hayward. I am here today as the Advocacy Program Director on behalf of Maine Citizens for Clean Elections (MCCE). I am testifying Neither For Nor Against LD 2232.

Maine Citizens for Clean Elections has been the leading campaign finance organization in Maine for almost thirty years and one of the nation's most respected state-based organizations advocating for democratically funded elections. We are proud of our national reputation. But we are all Mainers, and our nonpartisan mission has always been with and for the people of this state. No one in Maine has lamented the disastrous 2010 Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United v FEC* more strenuously or consistently than MCCE. The Appellate Court decision in *SpeechNow v FEC* followed soon after, and no one has worked harder over all these years to find a way to rein in contributions to PACs, including independent expenditure PACs (aka Super PACs) than MCCE. Even now, we fervently long for reform, even as the U.S. Supreme Court has left precious few grounds for hope.

Today in our country, we have more concentrated wealth and income than at any time since the beginning of the last century. There is nothing more antithetical to the rights of citizens in a democratic republic than concentrated wealth and power. The size of this gap now threatens confidence in capitalism itself.¹

Research at the federal level shows that legislators and policymakers are vastly more attentive to the interests of the affluent than they are to those of everyone else.² Affluent donors get what they want. The rest of us get what we want when, and only when, we want what they want. American democracy is

¹ Christopher Zara, "Davos Dialogs," Fast Company, January 11, 2024, <https://www.fastcompany.com/91008803/future-capitalism-survey-2024-threat-steakholders-income-inequality> [March 3, 2024]

² Martin Gilens, "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness," Russell Sage Foundation, <http://www.russellsage.org/research/inequality-and-democratic-responsiveness> [March 17 2013]

MCCE Action to VLA
LD 2232

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failing to serve the needs of the vast majority of its citizens. And our people know it.³ That's why so many of them signed the petition to put this question on the ballot. That's why this measure is sure to pass when put to voters in November.

The most extreme individual example of this recently in Maine – no one else comes close – is Tom Klingenstein, who from 2021 to 2022 single-handedly underwrote over \$2.5 million in independent expenditures from the Maine Families First PAC. Yes, that's right. He personally donated almost \$3 million to support Maine candidates. It's too much. That's just one example.

And so, we wholeheartedly support the aspirations of this bill and believe the U.S. Constitution could and should be interpreted to sustain a functioning democracy, including allowing states and Congress to regulate money in politics.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions from the Committee.

³ Katherine J. Cramer and Jonathan D. Cohen, "Many Americans Believe the Economy Is Rigged," New York Times, February 21, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/21/opinion/economy-research-greed-profit.html?unlocked_article_code=1.Z00.7COE.zDq03bGvwKYC&smid=url-share [March 3, 2024]

Testimony of Peter L. Murray in Support of LD 2232 – An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Actions Committees that Make Independent Expenditures.

Before the 131 Maine Legislature, Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs

March 6, 2024

Senator Hickman, Representative Supica, Members of the Veterans and Legal Affairs

Committee:

My name is Peter Murray. I have lived and practiced law in Portland, Maine since 1967. Thank you for permitting me to present my testimony via Zoom. My wife underwent a serious foot operation yesterday, which requires me to be at home to take care of her.

My testimony is submitted in support of LD 2232, “An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees that Make Independent Expenditures.” This legislation offers the State of Maine an opportunity to lead our nation in coming to terms with the flood of big money in the form of contributions to SuperPACS that threaten to submerge the will of the Maine electorate in important contested elections.

While contributions to political candidates to support their campaigns are currently regulated in terms of source and amount, contributions to so called SuperPACS that often make massive and unregulated “independent” expenditures in political campaigns have not been effectively regulated either here in Maine or elsewhere in the United States since shortly after the Supreme Court decided *Citizens United v. FEC* in 2010. The result of this lack of regulation has been huge increases in dark money contributions and expenditures designed to influence key races such as the recent Senatorial contest between Susan Collins and Sara Gideon and the Pine Tree Power referendum last year.

For more than a decade since *Citizens United* was decided, it has been generally assumed that the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case would prevent states or the Federal Government from effectively regulating the limitless sums currently being expended to influence political races. Recently, however, some reform-minded legal scholars have taken another hard look at *Citizens United*. Although that decision makes clear that "independent" political expenditures enjoy a high degree of protection under the First Amendment, there may be some room for constitutional regulation of contributions to the political action committees that make the expenditures. It is hard to believe that large contributions to a SuperPAC that then made independent expenditures to influence an election would not affect the behavior of an office holder whose candidacy had been benefited by such contributions. For example, Senator Robert Menendez is alleged to have provided political favors in exchange for contributions to a designated SuperPAC. Under the current system, neither the SuperPAC nor the public would be aware of such an arrangement. Even though large PAC expenditures may be immune from regulation, large contributions to PAC's can raise a sufficient issue of *quid pro quo* corruption or the appearance of this kind of corruption to support regulation according to principles accepted in *Citizens United*.

LD 2232 puts this proposition to the test. The bill sets a \$5,000 annual limit on any individual's or corporate entity's contributions to any single political action committee that makes direct expenditures for the purpose of influencing an election. It also requires political action committees that make expenditures to report to the Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices on the total amount of contributions received from each contributor.

The bill does not forbid contributions to PACS that make expenditures, it merely sets a generous limit on the amount of such contributions per contributor per PAC per year and requires that the identify of the contributors and amount of the contributions be reported. It should be noted that this regulation does not apply to those PACS which make regulated contributions to candidates. It only tries to limit, to some extent, the huge flow of unregulated money that is flowing to PACS that make “independent” expenditures directly.

In my opinion, and the opinions of other lawyers who have looked hard at this approach, the regulation incorporated in LD 2232 would not unconstitutionally trammel anyone’s First Amendment rights. By focusing on the contributions, rather than the expenditures, the regulation addresses the appearance of corruption that is generated by big contributions to PACs that make expenditures to influence elections. Candidates are strictly limited in the size of contributions they may accept for their campaigns. However, the large contributors who wish to influence a candidate’s performance in office need only make their excess contributions to a SuperPAC that will make independent expenditures in support of the favored candidate. The corrupting effect is pretty much the same as if the money had been given to the candidate directly. By limiting a contributor’s annual contributions to any one PAC to \$5,000, LD 2332 makes it hard for any one contributor to deploy a large enough sum for any candidate that would exercise a corrupting influence.

There is no doubt that the enactment of LD 2232 by the Legislature, or its enactment by referendum if the Legislature does not take its opportunity to step up on this one, will lead to legal challenges by the big money contributors and perhaps by the media purveyors that these contributions enrich. In my judgment, this is a battle that the State of Maine, with the support

of national groups dedicated to reducing the influence of big money in politics, can win. And if it does win, Maine's law will be a model for the nation. We will finally be able to make some progress in regulating and reducing the influence of big money on American elections.

It may be tempting to the Committee and to the Legislature simply to pass on this one, to allow the citizen-initiated bill that is LD 2232 to go out to the people in referendum this fall. However, the results of the last referendum dealing with election finance should give us all a pretty good idea where the people of Maine stand. LD 2232 is a challenge to us all to do anything we can to save our political system. Please report this remarkable piece of legislation "Ought to Pass",

Peter L. Murray



Maine Education Association

Grace Leavitt President | Jesse Hargrove Vice President | Beth French Treasurer
Rebecca Cole NEA Director | Rachelle Bristol Executive Director

March 6, 2024

Re: LD 2232

Senator Hickman, Representative Supika, and members of the Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs,

My name is Ben Grant and I am the General Counsel of the Maine Education Association. The MEA represents nearly 24,000 educators in our Maine system of public education, in pre-K-12 schools as well as in our institutions of higher education, and both retired and aspiring educators.

I am here to testify in opposition to LD 2232. While MEA has long stood behind the notion that Citizens United was a bad decision and has produced significant negative impacts on elections, we oppose this bill because of the cynical way it purports to address the issue. While we all battle the erosion of campaign finance regulation, we all must also battle the seemingly endless rise in cynicism among the citizenry about the whole business of politics and government. Far too often, like in this case, that cynicism is justified.

What I mean by this is that we are once again facing the prospect of the voters of Maine being used as pawns in a legal strategy. If this matter moves forward, the voters are going to be asked to vote for something that even the proponents agree is blatantly unconstitutional – all for the purpose of ginning up a case to bring back to the Courts. Measures like this are superficially very popular, so we can all expect it to pass at the ballot box. But, like the ban on foreign spending or even the original RCV question, under the surface are serious constitutional problems. The reason this is important is because the referendum process has the added effect of ratcheting up public expectations about actually getting the result the people voted to implement. How many times are we going to put a question before the people that we know they cannot have – even with a “yes” vote? How much more cynicism are we willing to intentionally sew?

This is as good a time as any to say “Stop” – and so the MEA urges the Committee to take whatever steps necessary to prevent this measure from going to the ballot.

Thank you,

Ben Grant
General Counsel, MEA



**Maine State Legislature
OFFICE OF POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS**

www.mainelegislature.gov/opla
13 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333-0013
(207) 287-1670

BILL ANALYSIS

TO: Members, Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs
FROM: Rachel Olson, Legislative Analyst
DATE: March 12, 2024
RE: **IB 5/LD 2232, An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That Make Independent Expenditures** (initiated bill)

Bill Summary

This initiated bill limits the amount of contributions that may be made by individuals and by political action committees and business entities to political action committees that make independent expenditures. In both cases, the aggregate limit is \$5,000 in any calendar year. A political action committee may only use funds received in this manner when making independent expenditures and the political action committee is required to keep an account of any contributions received for the purpose of making those expenditures.

This initiated bill also requires that a report by a person, party committee or political action committee that makes any independent expenditure in excess of \$250 during any one candidate's election must contain an itemized account of the total contributions from each contributor.

Testimony: (This section is not intended to reflect all comments.)

Date of public hearing: *March 6, 2024*

List of individuals and entities/organizations submitting testimony:

In favor: Cara McCormick, Citizens to End Super PACs; Lawrence Lessig, EqualCitizens; Maia Cook, Research Assistant to Lawrence Lessig and Yale University student; Adam Cote, Drummond Woodsum; Senator Rick Bennett; Jack McCormick, Cape Elizabeth High School student; Sandra Heart, Cape Elizabeth High School student; Peter Murray, Portland, ME; Ron Fein, Legal Director, Free Speech For People;

In opposition: Ben Grant, General Counsel, Maine Education Association;

Neither for, nor against: Kate Knox, Bernstein Shur, Rebuild Maine; Will Hayward, Maine Citizens for Clean Election;

Written testimony, if submitted, is available online through legislature.maine.gov

Potential Issues, Technical Problems or Issues for Consideration:

- Title 21-A no longer has definitions for "leadership political action committee" or "separate segregated fund committee".
- It was noted by those who testified, that this proposal would most likely result in a court challenge related to the First Amendment and the decision in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010). Those testifying in favor of the proposal see this as an opportunity to challenge aspects of that ruling regarding money in politics. Others who testified against the proposal or neither for nor against the proposal were concerned about using Maine as a test case,

the impact on the expectations of voters in the state, and the potential unintended consequences of such a case.

Committee Requests for Additional Information:

- Senator Timberlake request data regarding contributions to the ballot question committee that put forward this bill, Citizens to End Super PACs.

The initial filing report, January quarterly report and a major contributor report from EqualCitizens can be found with these materials. These reports can also be found on the Maine Ethics Commission website.

Additional Information:

- As an initiated bill, the following paths/options apply:
 - **OTP report** (no change) – approved by both houses and the governor – enacted into law
 - **OTP-A report** – approved by both houses and the governor – sent to voters as a competing measure with the original bill
 - **ONTP report** – sent to voters
- **§1015** and **§1019-B**, which are being amended by the bill, are attached.
- **Relevant definitions:**

Citation/Source	Definition
21-A MRSA §1019-B Reports of independent expenditures	<p>1. Independent expenditures; definition. For the purposes of this section, an "independent expenditure" means any expenditure made by a person, party committee or political action committee that is not made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized political committee or an agent of either and that:</p> <p>A. Is made to design, produce or disseminate any communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; or</p> <p>B. Unless the person, party committee or political action committee making the expenditure demonstrates under subsection 2 that the expenditure did not have a purpose or effect of influencing the nomination, election or defeat of the candidate, is made to design, produce or disseminate a communication that names or depicts a clearly identified candidate and is disseminated during the 28 days, including election day, before a primary election; during the 35 days, including election day, before a special election; or from Labor Day to a general election day.</p>
"business entity" can be found in Sec. 2 of the bill, on lines 26-28	... "For the purposes of this subsection, "business entity" includes a firm, partnership, corporation, incorporated association, labor organization or other organization, whether organized as a for-profit or a nonprofit entity."
21-A MRSA §1001. Definitions subchapter 1 – General Provisions	1-A. Caucus political action committee. "Caucus political action committee" means a political action committee designated under section 1053-C to promote the election of nominees of a political party to the Senate or the House of Representatives.

<p>21-A MRSA §1052. Definitions subchapter 4 – Reports by PAC & BQC</p>	<p>5. Political action committee. The term "political action committee":</p> <p>A. Includes:</p> <p>(1) Any separate or segregated fund established by any corporation, membership organization, cooperative or labor or other organization that receives contributions or makes expenditures aggregating more than \$2,500 in a calendar year for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate to political office; and</p> <p>(5) Any person, including any corporation or association, other than an individual, that receives contributions or makes expenditures aggregating more than \$2,500 in a calendar year for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of any candidate to political office; and</p> <p>B. Does not include:</p> <p>(1) A candidate or a candidate's treasurer under section 1013-A, subsection 1;</p> <p>(2) A candidate's authorized political committee under section 1013-A, subsection 1, paragraph B;</p> <p>(3) A party committee under section 1013-A, subsection 3; or</p> <p>(4) An exempt donor. (See below)</p> <p>3-A. Exempt donor. "Exempt donor" means a person that has not received contributions for the purpose of influencing a campaign in the prior 2 years and whose only payments of money to influence a campaign in the prior 2 years are:</p> <p>A. Contributions of money to candidates, party committees, political action committees or ballot question committees registered with the commission or a municipality; or</p> <p>B. Payments for goods or services with an aggregate value of no more than \$100,000 contributed to candidates, party committees, political action committees or ballot question committees registered with the commission or a municipality.</p>
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Preliminary Fiscal Impact Statement: No preliminary fiscal note at this time.

§1015. Limitations on contributions and expenditures

1. Contributions by individuals. An individual may not make contributions to a candidate in support of the candidacy of one person aggregating more than \$1,950 in any election for a gubernatorial candidate, more than \$475 for a legislative candidate, more than \$575 for a candidate for municipal office and more than \$975 in any election for any other candidate. This limitation does not apply to contributions in support of a candidate by that candidate or that candidate's spouse or domestic partner. Beginning December 1, 2024, contribution limits in accordance with this subsection are adjusted every 2 years based on the Consumer Price Index as reported by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and rounded to the nearest amount divisible by \$25. The commission shall post the current contribution limit and the amount of the next adjustment and the date that it will become effective on its publicly accessible website and include this information with any publication to be used as a guide for candidates.

[PL 2023, c. 244, §4 (AMD).]

2. Contributions by party committees, ballot question committees and political action committees.

[PL 2023, c. 244, §5 (RP).]

2-A. Contributions by business entities.

[PL 2023, c. 244, §6 (RP).]

2-B. Committees; corporations; associations. A political committee, political action committee, ballot question committee or other committee, firm, partnership, corporation, association or organization may not make contributions to a candidate in support of the candidacy of one person aggregating more than \$1,950 in any election for a gubernatorial candidate, more than \$475 for a legislative candidate, more than \$575 for a candidate for municipal office and more than \$975 in any election for any other candidate. Beginning December 1, 2024, contribution limits in accordance with this subsection are adjusted every 2 years based on the Consumer Price Index as reported by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and rounded to the nearest amount divisible by \$25. The commission shall post the current contribution limit and the amount of the next adjustment and the date that it will become effective on its publicly accessible website and include this information with any publication to be used as a guide for candidates.

[PL 2023, c. 244, §7 (NEW).]

3. Aggregate contributions.

[PL 2023, c. 324, §9 (RP).]

4. Political committees; intermediaries. For the purpose of the limitations imposed by this section, contributions made to any political committee authorized by a candidate to accept contributions on the candidate's behalf are considered to be contributions made to that candidate. If the campaign activities of a political action committee within a calendar year primarily promote or support the nomination or election of a single candidate, contributions to the committee that were solicited by the candidate are considered to be contributions made to the candidate for purposes of the limitations in this section. For purposes of this subsection, solicitation of contributions includes but is not limited to the candidate's appearing at a fundraising event organized by or on behalf of the political action committee or suggesting that a donor make a contribution to that committee.

For the purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, that are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to the candidate are considered to be contributions from that person to the candidate. The intermediary or conduit shall report the original source and the intended recipient of the contribution to the commission and to the intended recipient.

[PL 2011, c. 389, §14 (AMD).]

MRS Title 21-A, §1015. LIMITATIONS ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

5. Other contributions and expenditures. Any expenditure made by any person in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's political committee or their agents is considered to be a contribution to that candidate.

The financing by any person of the dissemination, distribution or republication, in whole or in part, of any broadcast or any written or other campaign materials prepared by the candidate, the candidate's political committee or committees or their authorized agents is considered to be a contribution to that candidate.

[PL 1989, c. 504, §§7, 31 (AMD).]

6. Prohibited expenditures. A candidate, a treasurer, a political committee, a party or party committee, a person required to file a report under this subchapter or their authorized agents may not make any expenditures for liquor to be distributed to or consumed by voters while the polls are open on election day.

[PL 1991, c. 839, §11 (AMD); PL 1991, c. 839, §34 (AFF).]

7. Voluntary limitations on political expenditures. A candidate may voluntarily agree to limit the total expenditures made on behalf of that candidate's campaign as specified in section 1013-A, subsection 1, paragraph C and subsections 8 and 9.

[PL 1995, c. 384, §2 (NEW).]

8. Political expenditure limitation amounts. Total expenditures in any election for legislative office by a candidate who voluntarily agrees to limit campaign expenditures as provided in subsection 7 are as follows:

A. For State Senator, \$25,000; and [PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §14 (AMD).]

B. For State Representative, \$5,000. [PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §14 (AMD).]

C. [PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §14 (RP).]

Expenditure limits are per election and may not be carried forward from one election to another. For calculation and reporting purposes, the reporting periods established in section 1017 apply.

[PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §14 (AMD).]

9. Publication of list. The commission shall publish a list of the candidates for State Representative and State Senator who have agreed to voluntarily limit total expenditures for their campaigns as provided in section 1013-A, subsection 1, paragraph C.

For the purposes of subsections 7 and 8 and this subsection, "total expenditures" means the sum of all expenditures made to influence a single election that are made by a candidate or made on the candidate's behalf by the candidate's political committee or committees, the candidate's party or the candidate's immediate family.

[PL 1995, c. 384, §2 (NEW).]

10. Business entity defined.

[PL 2023, c. 244, §8 (RP).]

SECTION HISTORY

PL 1985, c. 161, §6 (NEW). PL 1989, c. 504, §§7,31 (AMD). PL 1991, c. 839, §11 (AMD). PL 1991, c. 839, §34 (AFF). IB 1995, c. 1, §11 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 384, §2 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 729, §§2,3 (AMD). PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §§10-14 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 286, §§2, 3 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 382, §§1, 2 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 389, §14 (AMD). PL 2019, c. 51, §§1, 2 (AMD). PL 2019, c. 51, §3 (AFF). PL 2021, c. 274, §§4-7 (AMD). PL 2021, c. 274, §13 (AFF). PL 2021, c. 607, §1 (AMD). PL 2021, c. 607, §5 (AFF). PL 2023, c. 244, §§4-8 (AMD). PL 2023, c. 324, §9 (AMD).

§1019-B. Reports of independent expenditures

1. Independent expenditures; definition. For the purposes of this section, an "independent expenditure" means any expenditure made by a person, party committee or political action committee that is not made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized political committee or an agent of either and that:

A. Is made to design, produce or disseminate any communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; or [PL 2021, c. 132, §7 (AMD).]

B. Unless the person, party committee or political action committee making the expenditure demonstrates under subsection 2 that the expenditure did not have a purpose or effect of influencing the nomination, election or defeat of the candidate, is made to design, produce or disseminate a communication that names or depicts a clearly identified candidate and is disseminated during the 28 days, including election day, before a primary election; during the 35 days, including election day, before a special election; or from Labor Day to a general election day. [PL 2023, c. 324, §10 (AMD).]

[PL 2023, c. 324, §10 (AMD).]

2. Commission determination. A person, party committee or political action committee may request a determination that an expenditure that otherwise meets the definition of an independent expenditure under subsection 1, paragraph B is not an independent expenditure by filing a signed written statement with the commission within 7 days of disseminating the communication stating that the cost was not incurred with a purpose of influencing the nomination, election or defeat of a candidate, supported by any additional evidence the person, party committee or political action committee chooses to submit. The commission may gather any additional evidence it determines relevant and material. The commission shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the cost was incurred with a purpose of, or had the effect of, influencing the nomination, election or defeat of a candidate. In order to make this determination, the commission shall consider whether the language and other elements of the communication would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the communication had a purpose of, or had the effect of, influencing an election. The commission may consider other factors, including, but not limited to, the timing of the communication, the recipients of the communication or, if the communication is a digital communication, any links to publicly accessible websites related to the nomination, election or defeat of a candidate. The commission's executive director shall make an initial determination on the request, which must be posted on the commission's publicly accessible website. Any person may appeal the initial determination, which must be considered by the commission at the next public meeting that is feasible.

[PL 2023, c. 324, §11 (AMD).]

3. Report required; content; rules.

[PL 2009, c. 524, §6 (RPR); MRSA T. 21-A §1019-B, sub-§3 (RP).]

4. Report required; content; rules. A person, party committee or political action committee that makes any independent expenditure in excess of \$250 during any one candidate's election shall file a report with the commission. In the case of a municipal election, the report must be filed with the municipal clerk.

A. A report required by this subsection must be filed with the commission according to a reporting schedule that the commission shall establish by rule that takes into consideration existing campaign finance reporting requirements. Rules adopted pursuant to this paragraph are routine technical rules as defined in Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 2-A. [PL 2011, c. 558, §2 (AMD).]

B. A report required by this subsection must contain an itemized account of each expenditure in excess of \$250 in any one candidate's election, the date and purpose of each expenditure and the name of each payee or creditor. The report must state whether the expenditure is in support of or

MRS Title 21-A, §1019-B. REPORTS OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES

in opposition to the candidate and must include, under penalty of unsworn falsification, as provided in Title 17-A, section 453, a statement whether the expenditure is made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, the candidate or an authorized committee or agent of the candidate. [PL 2023, c. 324, §12 (AMD).]

C. A report required by this subsection must be on a form prescribed and prepared by the commission. A person filing this report may use additional pages if necessary, but the pages must be the same size as the pages of the form. The commission may adopt procedures requiring the electronic filing of an independent expenditure report, as long as the commission adopts an exception for persons who lack access to the required technology or the technological ability to file reports electronically. [PL 2023, c. 324, §13 (AMD).]
[PL 2023, c. 324, §§12, 13 (AMD).]

5. Exclusions. An independent expenditure does not include:

A. [PL 2021, c. 132, §9 (RP).]

B. A telephone survey that meets generally accepted standards for polling research and that is not conducted for the purpose of changing the voting position of the call recipients or discouraging them from voting; [PL 2011, c. 389, §21 (NEW).]

C. A telephone call naming a clearly identified candidate that identifies an individual's position on a candidate, ballot question or political party for the purpose of encouraging the individual to vote, as long as the call contains no advocacy for or against any candidate; and [PL 2011, c. 389, §21 (NEW).]

D. A voter guide that consists primarily of candidates' responses to surveys and questionnaires and that contains no advocacy for or against any candidate. [PL 2011, c. 389, §21 (NEW).]
[PL 2021, c. 132, §9 (AMD).]

SECTION HISTORY

PL 2003, c. 448, §3 (NEW). PL 2007, c. 443, Pt. A, §20 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 366, §5 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 366, §12 (AFF). PL 2009, c. 524, §§6, 7 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 389, §§20, 21 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 389, §62 (AFF). PL 2011, c. 558, §2 (AMD). PL 2013, c. 334, §§15, 16 (AMD). IB 2015, c. 1, §§5, 6 (AMD). PL 2015, c. 350, §6 (AMD). PL 2019, c. 323, §§15-17 (AMD). PL 2021, c. 132, §§7-9 (AMD). PL 2023, c. 324, §§10-13 (AMD).

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Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices
 Mail: 135 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333
 Office: 45 Memorial Circle, Augusta, Maine
 Website: www.maine.gov/ethics
 Phone: 207-287-4179
 Fax: 207-287-6775

2023 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT

FOR POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES

COMMITTEE		TREASURER	
COMMITTEE TO END SUPERPACS PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME 04116 PHONE: (207) 310-4527 EMAIL: committeetoendsuperpacs@gmail.com		Ms. AVERY ARENA PO Box 2122 South Portland, ME 04116 PHONE: EMAIL: avery.arena@gmail.com	
REPORT	DUE DATE	REPORTING PERIOD	
Initial Financial Report	11/01/2023	01/01/2023 - 10/25/2023	

FINANCIAL ACTIVITY SUMMARY

RECEIPTS	TOTAL FOR PERIOD	TOTAL FOR YEAR
1. CASH CONTRIBUTIONS (SCHEDULE A)	\$100.00	\$100.00
2. OTHER CASH RECEIPTS (INTEREST, ETC.)	\$0.00	\$0.00
3. LOANS (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	\$0.00
4. TOTAL RECEIPTS (LINE 1 + 2 + 3)	\$100.00	\$100.00
EXPENDITURES		
5. EXPENDITURES TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE (SCHEDULE B)	\$0.00	\$0.00
6. OPERATING EXPENDITURES (SCHEDULE B-1)	\$0.00	\$0.00
7. LOAN REPAYMENTS (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	\$0.00
8. TOTAL PAYMENTS (LINE 5 + 6 + 7)	\$0.00	\$0.00
CASH SUMMARY		
9. CASH BALANCE AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD	\$0.00	
10. PLUS TOTAL RECEIPTS THIS PERIOD (LINE 4)	\$100.00	
11. MINUS TOTAL PAYMENTS THIS PERIOD (LINE 8)	\$0.00	
12. CASH BALANCE AT END OF PERIOD	\$100.00	
OTHER ACTIVITY		
13. IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS (SCHEDULE A-1)	\$0.00	\$0.00
14. TOTAL LOAN BALANCE AT END OF PERIOD (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	
15. TOTAL UNPAID DEBTS AT END OF PERIOD (SCHEDULE D)	\$0.00	

I, CARA MCCORMICK, CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS TRUE, ACCURATE, AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

REPORT FILED BY: CARA MCCORMICK
 REPORT FILED ON: 10/27/2023 5:17:20 PM
 LAST MODIFIED:
 COMMITTEE ID: 483635

SCHEDULE A CASH CONTRIBUTIONS

- For contributors who gave more than \$50, the names, address, occupation, and employer must be reported. If "information requested" is listed instead of occupation and employer, the candidate is waiting to receive that information.
- Cash contributions of \$50 or less can be added together and reported as a lump sum.
- Contributor Types

1 = Individual

2 = Candidate/ Spouse/ Domestic Partner

3 = Commercial Source

4 = Nonprofit Organization

5 = Political Action Committee

6 = Political Party Committee

7 = Ballot Question Committee

8 = Other Candidate/ Candidate Committee

9 = Candidate / Candidate Committee

10 = General Treasury Transfer

11 = Transfer from Previous Campaign

12 = Contributors giving \$50 or less

13 = Contributors giving \$100 or less

14 = Contributors giving \$200 or less

15 = MCEA Payment

16 = Financial Institution

DATE RECEIVED	CONTRIBUTOR	EMPLOYER AND OCCUPATION	TYPE	AMOUNT
10/25/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04116	SELF EMPLOYED General Business	1	\$100.00
TOTAL CASH CONTRIBUTIONS				\$100.00



Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices
 Mail: 135 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333
 Office: 45 Memorial Circle, Augusta, Maine
 Website: www.maine.gov/ethics
 Phone: 207-287-4179
 Fax: 207-287-6775

2024 CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT

FOR POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES

COMMITTEE		TREASURER
Citizens to End SuperPACs PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME 04116 PHONE:(207) 310-4527 EMAIL: committeetoendsuperpacs@gmail.com		Ms. AVERY ARENA PO Box 2122 South Portland, ME 04116 PHONE: EMAIL: avery.arena@gmail.com
REPORT	DUE DATE	REPORTING PERIOD
Committee January Quarterly	01/16/2024	10/26/2023 - 12/31/2023

FINANCIAL ACTIVITY SUMMARY

RECEIPTS	TOTAL FOR PERIOD	TOTAL FOR YEAR
1. CASH CONTRIBUTIONS (SCHEDULE A)	\$1,005.00	\$1,105.00
2. OTHER CASH RECEIPTS (INTEREST, ETC.)	\$0.00	\$0.00
3. LOANS (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	\$0.00
4. TOTAL RECEIPTS (LINE 1 + 2 + 3)	\$1,005.00	\$1,105.00
EXPENDITURES		
5. EXPENDITURES TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE (SCHEDULE B)	\$85.98	\$85.98
6. OPERATING EXPENDITURES (SCHEDULE B-1)	\$0.00	\$0.00
7. LOAN REPAYMENTS (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	\$0.00
8. TOTAL PAYMENTS (LINE 5 + 6 + 7)	\$85.98	\$85.98
CASH SUMMARY		
9. CASH BALANCE AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD	\$100.00	
10. PLUS TOTAL RECEIPTS THIS PERIOD (LINE 4)	\$1,005.00	
11. MINUS TOTAL PAYMENTS THIS PERIOD (LINE 8)	\$85.98	
12. CASH BALANCE AT END OF PERIOD	\$1,019.02	
OTHER ACTIVITY		
13. IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS (SCHEDULE A-1)	\$1,012,709.00	\$1,012,709.00
14. TOTAL LOAN BALANCE AT END OF PERIOD (SCHEDULE C)	\$0.00	
15. TOTAL UNPAID DEBTS AT END OF PERIOD (SCHEDULE D)	\$3,717.18	

I, CARA MCCORMICK, CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS TRUE, ACCURATE, AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

REPORT FILED BY: CARA MCCORMICK
 REPORT FILED ON: 1/16/2024 12:22:39 PM
 LAST MODIFIED:
 COMMITTEE ID: 483635

SCHEDULE A CASH CONTRIBUTIONS

- For contributors who gave more than \$50, the names, address, occupation, and employer must be reported. If "information requested" is listed instead of occupation and employer, the candidate is waiting to receive that information.
- Cash contributions of \$50 or less can be added together and reported as a lump sum.
- Contributor Types

1 = Individual

2 = Candidate/ Spouse/ Domestic Partner

3 = Commercial Source

4 = Nonprofit Organization

5 = Political Action Committee

6 = Political Party Committee

7 = Ballot Question Committee

8 = Other Candidate/ Candidate Committee

9 = Candidate / Candidate Committee

10 = General Treasury Transfer

11 = Transfer from Previous Campaign

12 = Contributors giving \$50 or less

13 = Contributors giving \$100 or less

14 = Contributors giving \$200 or less

15 = MCEA Payment

16 = Financial Institution

DATE RECEIVED	CONTRIBUTOR	EMPLOYER AND OCCUPATION	TYPE	AMOUNT
11/2/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04116	SELF EMPLOYED General Business	1	\$10.00
11/2/2023	L LESSIG 20 AMORY ST BROOKLINE, MA, 02446	Harvard Law School Teacher/Education	1	\$250.00
11/3/2023	SAM AUCIELLO 548 OLD COUNTY ROAD ROCKLAND, ME, 04841	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$25.00
11/8/2023	JEFFREY SAFFER 22 HUNTS POINT RD CAPE ELIZABETH, ME, 04107	Unknown Healthcare/Medical	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	BARRY KOHLER 97 Brydon Way Westbrook, ME, 04092	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	CYNTHIA HOWLAND 25 Water Street Brunswick, ME, 04011	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	EDDIE ANDERSON 275 RAMPART WAY APT 207 DENVER, CO, 80230	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	ELLEN GRANT 57 MACKWORTH STREET PORTLAND, ME, 04103	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00

12/4/2023	FREDERICK MILLER 35 LAMBERT RD FREEPORT, ME, 04032	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	GILLIAN BURNES 17 COTTAGE ST GARDINER, ME, 04345	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$5.00
12/4/2023	HALSEY SNOW 58 OVERLOOK LN CASCO, ME, 04015	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$25.00
12/4/2023	JOHN MCCALL 14 Karynel Drive South Portland, ME, 04106	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	MICHAEL BOYSON 82 Mackworth Street Portland, ME, 04103	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$100.00
12/4/2023	MICHAEL ERIC BERUBE 210 FESSENDEN HILL ROAD DENMARK, ME, 04022	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	PETER FELSENTAL 9 GOLDFINCH DRIVE TOPSHAM, ME, 04086	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	REINHOLD WAPPLER 362 Allen Road Pownal, ME, 04069	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$100.00
12/4/2023	RICHARD OCONNOR 84 CEDAR STREET BELFAST, ME, 04915	SELF EMPLOYED General Business	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	RICHARD WOLFE 43 Blanchard Rd Cumberland, ME, 04021	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$5.00
12/4/2023	SALLY NG 72 BOWDOIN ST PORTLAND, ME, 04102	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$50.00
12/4/2023	SANDY PARENT 7 MACAVITY DRIVE TURNER, ME, 04282	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$5.00
12/4/2023	THOMAS GOETTING 18 WASHINGTON ST LUBEC, ME, 04652	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00

12/4/2023	TOM MIKULKA 6 ARROW POINT ROAD CAPE ELIZABETH, ME, 04107	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	VITTORIA MCILHENNY PO BOX 574 NORTHEAST HARBOR, ME, 04662	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$25.00
12/4/2023	WILLIAM JENKS 29 ROBIE STREET GORHAM, ME, 04038	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/4/2023	WILLIAM WILLAUER 8 SANCTUARY LANE SCARBOROUGH, ME, 04074	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$5.00
12/5/2023	BILL BAKER 43 WEST CHIPMUNK LANE HARFORDS POINT, ME, 04442	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
12/8/2023	PAGE CLASON PO BOX 146 ISLESBORO, ME, 04848	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$50.00
12/10/2023	ELEANOR WEISMAN 1300 Belfast Rd Knox, ME, 04986	EMPLOYMENT INFO REQUESTED	1	\$10.00
TOTAL CASH CONTRIBUTIONS				\$1,005.00

SCHEDULE A - 1 **IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS**

- In-kind contributions are goods and services (including facilities) that a candidate received at no cost or at a cost less than the fair market value. they include all goods and services purchased for the campaign by the candidate or supporters if the campaign does not expect to reimburse the candidate or supporter. These contributions may come from the candidate, candidate's family, supporters, PACs, party committees, or other entities.
- For contributors who gave more than \$50, the names, address, occupation, and employer must be reported. If "information requested" is listed instead of occupation and employer, the candidate is waiting to receive that information.
- In-kind contributions of \$50 or less can be added together and reported as a lump sum.
- If the candidate received a discount on goods and services, the amount of the discount must be reported as an in-kind contribution.
- Total contributions (cash and in-kind) from the same source (except the candidate and candidate's spouse or domestic partner) may NOT exceed \$350 in any election for the legislative candidates, \$750 for county candidates, or \$1500 for gubernatorial candidates. For party candidates, the primary and general elections are considered separate election. For non-party candidates, there is only one election, the general election.

1 = Individual

2 = Candidate/ Spouse/ Domestic Partner

3 = Commercial Source

4 = Nonprofit Organization

5 = Political Action Committee

6 = Political Party Committee

7 = Ballot Question Committee

8 = Other Candidate/ Candidate Committee

9 = Candidate / Candidate Committee

10 = General Treasury Transfer

11 = Transfer from Previous Campaign

12 = Contributors giving \$50 or less

13 = Contributors giving \$100 or less

14 = Contributors giving \$200 or less

15 = MCEA Payment

16 = Financial Institution

DATE RECEIVED	CONTRIBUTOR'S NAME, ADDRESS, ZIP	EMPLOYER AND OCCUPATION	DESCRIPTION (of goods, services, facilities, or discounts received)	TYPE	AMOUNT
10/27/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	4	\$100,000.00
10/30/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	4	\$300,000.00
10/30/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR LEGAL AND CONSULTING SERVICES PAID TO DRUMMOND WOODSUM	4	\$4,098.00
11/8/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	4	\$600,000.00

12/11/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR LEGAL AND CONSULTING SERVICES PAID TO DRUMMOND WOODSUM.	4	\$8,320.00
12/14/2023	EQUALCITIZENS.US 1690 BOSTON RD #1118 SPRINGFIELD, MA, 01129		INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR LEGAL AND CONSULTING SERVICES PAID TO DRUMMOND WOODSUM.	4	\$291.00
TOTAL IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS					\$1,012,709.00

**SCHEDULE B
EXPENDITURES TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE**

EXPENDITURE TYPES				
APP	Apparel (t-shirts, hats, embroidery, etc.)	CON	Contribution to party committee, non-profit, other candidate, etc.	
EQP	Equipment of \$50 or more (computer, tablet, phone, furniture, etc.)	EVT	Campaign and fundraising events (venue or booth rental, entertainment, supplies, etc.)	
FOD	Food for campaign events or volunteers, catering	HRD	Hardware and small tools (hammer, nails, lumber, paint, etc.)	
LIT	Printed campaign materials (palmcards, signs, stickers, flyers, etc.)	MHS	Mail house and direct mail (design, printing, mailing, and postage all included)	
NEW	Newspaper and print media ads only	OFF	Office supplies, rent, utilities, internet service, phone minutes and data	
ONL	Social media and online advertising only	OTH	Other and fees (bank, contribution, and money order fees, etc.)	
PER	Personnel and campaign staff, consulting, and independent contractor costs	PHO	Phones (phone banking, robocalls and texts)	
POL	Polling and survey research	POS	Postage for U.S. Mail and mail box fees	
PRO	Professional services (graphic design, legal services, web design, etc.)	RAD	Radio ads, production costs	
TKT	Entrance cost to event (ban suppers, fairs, party events, etc.)	TRV	Travel (fuel, mileage, lodging, etc.)	
TVN	TV/cable ads, production, and media buyer costs only	WEB	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.)	
DATE OF EXPENDITURE	PAYEE	REMARK	TYPE	AMOUNT
12/31/2023	STRIPE 354 OYSTER POINT BLVD. SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO, CA, 90480	FEES PAYMENT OF \$85.98 TO SUPPORT: Limiting contributions to political action committees that make independent expenditures	OTH	\$85.98
TOTAL EXPENDITURES TO SUPPORT OR OPPOSE:				\$85.98

**SCHEDULE D
UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS**

- A debt or obligation is incurred if a committee places an order for a good or service without making a payment; makes a promise or agreement to pay for a good or service; signs a contract for a good or service; or receives delivery of a good or service for which the committee has not paid.
- This schedule is a list of all debts and obligations of the committee as of the end of this reporting period.

DATE OF OBLIGATION	CREDITOR	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
10/26/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) SQUARESPACE MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$33.00
10/30/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Office supplies, rent, utilities, internet service, phone minutes and data PURCHASE OF VOTER FILE DATA FROM CORP ELECTIONS VERIFONE - CROSS BUILDING, 4TH FLOOR, AUGUSTA, ME 04330	\$2,200.00
11/14/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Personnel and campaign staff, consulting, and independent contractor costs PAYMENT TO AVERA ARENA FOR CAMPAIGN CONSULTING SERVICES	\$1,207.50
11/25/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) ISTOCKPHOTO MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$73.85
11/25/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) SQUARESPACE INC. MONTHLY CHARGE	\$33.00
11/29/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) CANVA MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$14.99
12/25/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) ISTOCKPHOTO MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$73.85
12/25/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) SQUARESPACE MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$33.00
12/26/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) ACTIONNETWORK TOOLS - MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$33.00
12/29/2023	CARA MCCORMICK PO BOX 2122 SOUTH PORTLAND, ME, 04106	Website and internet costs (website domain and registration, etc.) CANVA.COM MONTHLY PAYMENT	\$14.99
TOTAL UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS			\$3,717.18



Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices
Mail: 135 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333
Office: 45 Memorial Circle, Augusta ME, 04333

Website: www.maine.gov/ethics
Phone: 207-287-4179
Fax: 207-287-6775

Major Contributor Report 2023 Election

Regular Reporting Deadlines		
Name of Report:	Filing Deadline	If the Notice is received between:
April Quarterly Report	April 10, 2023	January 1 – March 31, 2023
July Quarterly Report	July 17, 2023	April 1 – June 30, 2023
42-Day Pre-Election Report	September 26, 2023	July 1 – September 19, 2023
11-Day Pre-Election Report	October 27, 2023	September 20 – October 24, 2023
January Quarterly Report	January 16, 2024	October 25 – December 31, 2023
Deadline - Last 13 Days before an Election		
Name of Report:	If the Notice is received between:	The Report is due on or before:
2-Day Election Report	During the last 13 days before an election	Within 2 business days of receiving notice.
NOTE: if the Notice is receiving during the last 13 days before a primary, general, or special election then the Report is due within 2 business days and not by the due date of a Regular Finance Report.		
Organization Information		
Organization Name EqualCitizens.US		
Mailing Address 1690 Boston Rd, #1118		Phone: +1-857-285-2805
City, State Zip Springfield, MA 01129		Email info@equalcitizens.us
Responsible Officer Name and Position Lawrence Lessig, CEO		
Form of Organization and Purpose Non-profit, dedicated to reforms that will achieve citizen equality		
Tax Status		
Does this Organization currently have a tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service?		
Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		
If Yes, under what section of the tax code does it claim an exemption? 501(C)(4)		
Please list all jurisdictions with which this Organization files campaign finance reports		
1. United States		
2. Massachusetts		
3.		
4.		

Recipient Information

Name of Recipient

Citizens to End SuperPACs

Mailing Address of Recipient

PO BOX 2122, Portland, ME 04116

Date of First Contribution to Recipient

10/27/23

Total Amount Given to Recipient to Date

\$1,012,709.00

Itemized Contributions Given to Recipient Committee to Date
(If additional space is needed, continue on the "Schedule B-MC-2" Worksheet)

Date	Type of Contribution (e.g. cash or in-kind. If in-kind, describe goods or services given.)	Amount
10/27/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	\$100,000.00
10/30/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	\$300,000.00
10/30/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO DrummondWoodsum	\$4,098.00
11/08/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO SIGN2VOTE, INC.	\$600,000.00

Organization Source of Funds

(continued)

Please provide the names of the five largest sources of funds received by this organization during the period beginning six months prior to the first contribution this organization made to the recipient ballot question committee or political action committee. Do not include the names of sources of funds that are restricted to purposes unrelated to a direct initiative or people's veto referendum campaign.

1. Arjun Rao

2. Steve Jurvetson

3. Vin Ryan

4.

5.

Certification of receipt of contributions to influence a Maine ballot question

Has this organization received contributions, in whole or in part, for the purpose of initiating or influencing a direct initiative or people's veto referendum campaign in Maine?

☒ Yes (If so, complete and attach the "Contributions Received to Influence Maine Ballot Question" Worksheet)

☐ No

I Certify that the information in this report is true, correct, and complete.

Signature of Responsible Officer of Organization

1/16/2024

Date

Organization Name:

EqualCitizens.US

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
10/17/23	Steve Jurvetson 465 1st St. Los Altos, CA 94022	Cash	\$125,000.00
10/20/23	Arjun Rao 5911 Down Valley Ct Austin, TX 78731	Cash	\$250,000.00
10/25/23	Vincent Ryan 10705 Charlseton Blvd. Vero Beach, FL 32963	Cash	\$50,000.00
10/30/23	Kevin Brennan 10 Pumpkin Hill Rd Westport, CT 06880	Cash	\$20,000.00
10/31/23	Jeanne North 41 Warren Street Concord, NH 03301	Cash	\$50.00
10/31/23	Graeme Sephton 623 Wendell Rd Shutesbury, MA 01072	Cash	\$10.00
11/1/23	Steve Jurvetson 465 1st St. Los Altos, CA 94022	Loan (repaid)	\$500,000.00
11/3/23	Omid Kordestani 3053 Fillmore Street San Francisco, CA 94123	Cash	\$25,000.00
11/4/23	Marcia Morris 220 Boylston St Boston, MA 02116	Cash	\$7,500.00
11/4/23	John Ford 1500 N. Post Oak Rd. Ste. 190 Houston, TX 77055	Cash	\$500.00
11/4/23	Thomas Kehler 5 River Ridge Road Hanover, NH 03755	Cash	\$500.00
11/4/23	Avinash Kaushik 12577 Plymouth Dr. Saratoga, CA 95070	Cash	\$250.00
11/4/23	Christopher Kohnert 13328 NE 97th St Redmond, WA 98052	Cash	\$250.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Robin Chase 40 Cottage Street Cambridge, MA 02139	Cash	\$250.00
11/4/23	Alison Heiser 2830 Oakridge Road Neenah, WI 54956	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Barbara Davis 10820 N. Stargazer Dr Tucson, AZ 85737	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Barbara Katzenberg 37 Moon Hill Road Lexington, MA 02421	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Barbara Rogers 220 N. Zapata Hwy. Laredo, TX 78043	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Chris Sells 12290 Southwest Marion Street Tigard, OR 97223	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	David Glazer 263 Glenwood Ave Woodside, CA 94062	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Ellie Marks 77207 Tribeca Street Indian Wells, CA 92210	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Frances Lappe 37 Goden Street Belmont, MA 02478	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Georges Brun-Cottan 34 Baker Street Belmont, MA 02478	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Jon Kauffman 822 Long Dr Aberdeen, MD 21001	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Michael Keller 809 San Francisco Terrace Stanford, CA 94305	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Perry Naughton 4219 Starflower Fort Collins, CO 80526	Cash	\$100.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Susan Swartz 349 Marshman St. Highland Park, IL 60035	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Tyler Pepper 3831 S Lindas Way Bloomington, IN 47401	Cash	\$100.00
11/4/23	Leon Campise 2310 W 8th St Austin, TX 78703	Cash	\$66.00
11/4/23	George Maker 5951 Crystal Dr Beulah, MI 49617	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Greg Bond 325 Palisade Ave Jersey City, NJ 07307	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Jake Eagle PO BOX 190811 Hawi, HI 96719	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Jeff Atwood 410 Clayton Avenue El Cerrito, CA 94530	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Jim Snyder-Grant 18 Half Moon Hill Acton, MA 01720	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	John Fioretta 195 Arroyo Way San Jose, CA 95112	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	John Gerth 2094 Touraine Lane Half Moon Bay Half Moon Bay, CA 94019	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Joshua Jones 1093 Courtney Marie Ln Fallon, NV 89406	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Leanne Watt 766 East Colorado Blvd Suite 203 Pasadena, CA 91101	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Lena Plamondon 680 Kings Mountain Road Woodside, CA 94062	Cash	\$50.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Mark Germer 18 Whitney Way Topsham, ME 04086	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Melissa Brenneman 3209 Orlando Street Knoxville, TN 37917	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Nell L Farr 22 Cadillac Dr Apt 348 Sacramento, CA 95825	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Peeter Vilms 1217 14th Street Santa Rosa, CA 95404	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Richard Price 111 Clifford Terrace San Francisco, CA 94117	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Shawn Tabai 1340 Dahlia Loop San Jose, CA 95126	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Tom Parks 5892 Whitewater Drive Salt Lake City, UT 84121	Cash	\$50.00
11/4/23	Harry Sleeper 10 Alpine Way POBox513 Alton Bay, NH 03810	Cash	\$35.00
11/4/23	Dwight Rousu 13824 NE 70th Pl Redmond, WA 98052	Cash	\$33.33
11/4/23	David Christie 915 Peggy Ln Menlo Park, CA 94025	Cash	\$27.00
11/4/23	Alan Sukoenig 915 West End Ave. - Apt. 706 New York, NY 10025	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Andre Ryland 8355 Banberry Rd. Pensacola, FL 32514	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Brian Reed 4040 SW Tualatin Ave Portland, OR 97239	Cash	\$25.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Candace Brower 1304 Rook Dr Port Angeles, WA 98362	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Dav Yaginuma 126 Bridgeview Drive San Francisco, CA 94124	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	David Auger 116 Lancaster Road Groveton, NH 03582	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	David Malterre 70 W 107th St #3A New York, NY 10025	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Donn Carroll 38 Bank Street Newfield, NY 14867	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Eduardo Zambrano 3051 Augusta St. #3 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Hannah Williams 305 Arrowhead Dr Montgomery, AL 36117	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	James J. Serrell 25 Great Pond Rd Kingston, NH 03848	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Katharine Coon 10 Elm Street Peterborough, NH 03458	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Larry Burks 978 Chestnut Hill Cambridge, NY 12816	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Linda Wood 111 Sagamore Ridge Pl The Woodlands, TX 77389	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Philip Faulconer 83 Merry Lane Eugene, OR 97404	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Raymond Scruggs 101 Ridge Rd. San Anselmo, CA 94960	Cash	\$25.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Richard Hamilton 1111 Hyland Ave Ames, IA 50014	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Rob Price 4016 Sierra Dr Austin, TX 78731	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Santhosh Nair 10662 Toston Lane Glen Allen, VA 23060	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Sonya Dunne 101 Beverly Street 12U Boston, MA 02114	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Teresa Fry 73 Sanford St. Glens Falls, NY 12801	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Tom Stites 48 Kent Street Apt. 2 Newburyport, MA 01950	Cash	\$25.00
11/4/23	Chris Hansen 4556 Sprucedale Place Boulder, CO 80301	Cash	\$23.00
11/4/23	George Starrett 249 Shasta Drive Pittsburgh, PA 15239	Cash	\$20.00
11/4/23	Broderick Shoemaker 100 W. 138th St 3d New York, NY 10030	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	D. James Lawrie 1458 Popinjay Drive Reno, NV 89509	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Earl Gray 2505 Meadow Dr Lake Stevens, WA 98258	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Jeffrey D Shaffer 192 Village Lane Rochester, NY 14610	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Jody Dana 6733 Old Royalton Rd Cleveland, OH 44141	Cash	\$10.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1			
Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/4/23	Jon Yeager 5016 McDougal Rd Deer Park (Williams Valley), WA 99003	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Kishore Shetty 403 North Wabash Avenue Unit 403 Chicago, IL 60611	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Leslie Lakind 127 Ridgecrest Drive Santa Fe, NM 87505	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Paul Silver 1900 Bremen St Austin, TX 78703	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Penelope M Fine 4411 S Parkview Dr Salt Lake City, UT 84124	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Riley Nelson 710 W Grace St Apt 1 Chicago, IL 60613	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Scott Miller 7806 Rosewood Ave APT 4 Los Angeles, CA 90036	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	T. Ferree 2490 N. County Hospital Rd. Douglas, AZ 85607	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Tony Notto 11621 Olive ST NW Coon Rapids, MN 55448	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Nadezhda Karastoyanova 8360 118th St Apt 7B Queens, NY 11415	Cash	\$5.00
11/4/23	Sarah Soebbing 803 Dwight St Ypsilanti, MI 48198	Cash	\$10.00
11/4/23	Gregory Busch 203 N Kenilworth Ave Oak Park, IL 60302	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Judith Setla 990 7th N St Liverpool, NY 13088	Cash	\$100.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/5/23	Wilhelm Neuefeind 7128 Kingsbury Blvd Saint Louis, MO 63130	Cash	\$1,000.00
11/5/23	Margaret Chew Barringer Box 365 Narberth, PA 19072	Cash	\$500.00
11/5/23	Brian Behlendorf 305 Rancho de Maria Martinez, CA 94553	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	David Crum 2701 Arizona Street Albuquerque, NM 87110	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Elizabeth Kamio 44 Elm Street Wellesley, MA 02481	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Jared Stern PO Box 1027 Mountain View, CA 94042	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Linda Rost 417 Fulton St Palo Alto, CA 94301	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Stephen Leake 4600 Adeline St Apt 108 Emeryville, CA 94608	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Sylvia Russell 8 Croghan Ln Durham, NH 03824	Cash	\$100.00
11/5/23	Harvey Bock 202 Rawson Road Unit 1 Brookline, MA 02445	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	Jennifer Christian 95 Woodridge Road Wayland, MA 01778	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	Lev Israel 923 Warren Parkway Teaneck, NJ 07666	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	R O Mitts 1221 Eagles Point Ct East Lansing, MI 48823	Cash	\$50.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/5/23	Rob Bell 2164 Princeton Ave Saint Paul, MN 55105	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	Ronald Quave 107 West Circle Drive Lexington, SC 29072	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	Tyler Freeman 3190 24th st #6 San Francisco, CA 94110	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	William Arnold 219 E 2nd St #5D (AB) New York, NY 10009	Cash	\$50.00
11/5/23	Marcia LaHaie 511 Eberwhite Blvd Ann Arbor, MI 48103	Cash	\$30.00
11/5/23	Anton Raff 4396 Longchamp Drive Sarasota, FL 34235	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Ben Sutherland 2810 Nw Ariel Ter Portland, OR 97210	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Diane Abbott 69 Highland Terrace Needham, MA 02494	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Don Dillinger 6121 76th Dr SE Snohomish, WA 98290	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Dr Braddlee 1321 Upland Dr. # 8235 Houston, TX 77043	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Jason Imani 16223 SE 31st St Bellevue, WA 98008	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Jeremiah Cohick 2443 Fillmore St # 380-2993 San Francisco, CA 94115	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Larry Spelts 2402 Hanscombe Point Rd Johns Island, SC 29455	Cash	\$25.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/5/23	Philip Stephens 1233 E Laguana Dr Tempe, AZ 85282	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Ronald Hylton 100 W 89th Street New York, NY 10024	Cash	\$25.00
11/5/23	Carolyn Musser 1 Glen Court Apt122 Glen Rock, NJ 07452	Cash	\$15.00
11/5/23	Dave Elvin 4610 Bagley Ave N Seattle, WA 98103	Cash	\$10.00
11/5/23	Debra Morrison 2649 SW 104th St Seattle, WA 98146	Cash	\$10.00
11/5/23	Donna Walters 5425 Toombs Street Fair Oaks, CA 95628	Cash	\$10.00
11/5/23	Lisa Ammann 5175 SW Meadow Flower Dr Corvallis, OR 97333	Cash	\$10.00
11/5/23	James Jackson 1 Elizabeth George Dr Mashantucket, CT 06338	Cash	\$5.00
11/5/23	William Wilson 3670 Waitts Lake Rd Valley, WA 99181	Cash	\$5.00
11/6/23	David Johnson 3650 Appleton Street N.W. Washington, DC 20008	Cash	\$1,000.00
11/6/23	Kevin Johnson 5 Summer St Kingston, MA 02364	Cash	\$500.00
11/6/23	Ben Trainer 16260 Klondike Canyon Rd Carmel Valley, CA 93924	Cash	\$100.00
11/6/23	David Sheeks 344 Ridge Springs Dr Chapel Hill, NC 27516	Cash	\$100.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1			
Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/6/23	William Hayes 5868 Lyon Street Union Dale, PA 18470	Cash	\$100.00
11/6/23	Harry Parker 129 Rounsaville Rd Hampton, NJ 08827	Cash	\$50.00
11/6/23	Nitin Saini 1602 Stetson Dr. Wesley Chapel, FL 33543	Cash	\$50.00
11/6/23	Roy Clymer 713 Norwalk Lane Austin, TX 78703	Cash	\$50.00
11/6/23	Sarah Weil 1006 Angle Ave Northbrook, IL 60062	Cash	\$50.00
11/6/23	Elisabeth Dambolena 58 Mayflower Rd Needham, MA 02492	Cash	\$30.00
11/6/23	Karl E Fitzke 600 Austin Ln Herndon, VA 20170	Cash	\$25.00
11/6/23	Matthew Kolon 541 Irish Settlement Rd Underhill, VT 05489	Cash	\$25.00
11/6/23	Mark Williams 514 Americas Way PMB 14365 Box Elder, SD 57719	Cash	\$15.00
11/6/23	Caron Block 716 26th Santa Monica, CA 90402	Cash	\$10.00
11/6/23	Cheryl Sjostrom 75 Squire Court Dunedin, FL 34698	Cash	\$5.00
11/7/23	Gordon Allen 21 Summer St Antrim, NH 03440	Cash	\$50.00
11/7/23	Al Cannistraro 17 Secada Dr Clifton Park, NY 12065	Cash	\$25.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-1

Date Received	Contributor's Name, Address, Zip	Description	Total Amount
11/7/23	Equal Citizens Foundation 1032 15th St N.W. Suite 239 Washington, DC 20005	Loan	\$38,000.00
11/8/23	Judith Eda 4655 NE Killingsworth St UNIT 33 Portland, OR 97218	Cash	\$25.00
11/9/23	Steven Reed 10220 E Watson Rd St. Louis, MO 63127	Cash	\$60.00
11/9/23	Thomas Shiple 18 Phinney Road Lexington, MA 02421	Cash	\$25.00
11/12/23	Patricia Westwater-Jong 3 Autumn Lane Bolton, MA 01740	Cash	\$10.00
11/28/23	Vincent Ryan 10705 Charlseton Blvd. Vero Beach, FL 32963	Loan	\$500,000.00
11/30/23	Daniel Jones 27005 Palomares Road Castro Valley, CA 94552	Cash	\$10.00
12/4/23	Thomas Davis 516 Canyon Drive Lawrence, KS 66049	Cash	\$30.00
12/4/23	Bruce Griffeth Po Box 1766 Blue Ridge, GA 30513	Cash	\$20.00
12/17/23	Peter Turner 600 W Taylor Run Pky Alexandria, VA 22314	Cash	\$15.00
12/31/23	Unitemized	Cash	\$60.00

SCHEDULE B-MC-2

Itemized Contributions to Recipient Worksheet

- Please indicate the date, type of contribution, and amount.
- If the contribution was in-kind (goods or services), please describe the type of goods or services and provide the estimated fair-market value of the goods and services in the course of ordinary business as the amount of the contribution.
- Duplicate as needed.

Date	Description (cash or goods, services, or discounts received)	Value
12/11/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO DrummondWoodsum	\$8,320.00
12/14/23	INKIND CONTRIBUTION FOR SIGNATURE GATHERING SERVICES PAID TO DrummondWoodsum	\$291.00
Total contributions to recipient (this page only)		\$8,611.00
Total contributions to recipient		\$1,012,709.00

COMMITTEE VOTING TALLY SHEET

LD # or Confirmation:

2232

Committee:

Veterans and Legal Affairs

Date:

3-12-24

Motion:

ONTP

Motion by:

Hickman

Seconded by:

Rudnicki

Those Voting in Favor of the Motion	Recommendation of those opposed to the Motion					Absent	Abstain

Senators

Sen. Brenner	✓						
Sen. Hickman	✓						
Sen. Timberlake	✓						

Representatives

Rep. Collings	✓						
Rep. Williams	✓						
Rep. Andrews						✗	
Rep. Malon	✓						
Rep. Rudnicki	✓						
Rep. Supica	✓						
Rep. Rielly	✓						
Rep. Hymes	✓						
Rep. Montell	✓ RTR						
Rep. Boyer	✓ DMB						

COMMITTEE VOTING TALLY SHEET

LD # or Confirmation: LD 2232

Committee: Veterans and Legal Affairs

Date: 03/12/2024

Motion: Ought Not To Pass

Motion by: Sen. Hickman

Seconded by: Rep. Rudnicki

Those Voting in Favor of the Motion	Recommendation of those opposed to the Motion					Absent	Abstain

Senators

Sen. Hickman	X						
Sen. Brenner	X						
Sen. Timberlake	X						

Representatives

Rep. Supica	X						
Rep. Andrews						X	
Rep. Boyer	X						
Rep. Collings	X						
Rep. Hymes	X						
Rep. Malon	X						
Rep. Montell	X						
Rep. Rielly	X						
Rep. Rudnicki	X						
Rep. Williams	X						

SENATE

CRAIG V. HICKMAN, DISTRICT 14, CHAIR
STACY F. BRENNER, DISTRICT 30
JEFFREY L. TIMBERLAKE, DISTRICT 17

RACHEL OLSON, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
LYNNE CASWELL, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
MICHELLE HEBERT, COMMITTEE CLERK



HOUSE

LAURA D. SUPICA, BANGOR, CHAIR
MORGAN J. RIELLY, WESTBROOK
BENJAMIN T. COLLINGS, PORTLAND
MARC G. MALON II, BIDDEFORD
KAREN L. MONTELL, GARDINER
JOHN ANDREWS, PARIS
DAVID W. BOYER, JR., POLAND
BENJAMIN C. HYMES, WALDO
SHELLEY RUDNICKI, FAIRFIELD
LYNNE WILLIAMS, BAR HARBOR

STATE OF MAINE
ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST LEGISLATURE
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

March 19, 2024

Honorable Troy Dale Jackson, President of the Senate
Honorable Rachel Talbot Ross, Speaker of the House
131st Legislature
State House
Augusta, Maine 04333

Dear President Jackson and Speaker Talbot Ross:

Pursuant to Joint Rule 310, we are writing to notify you that the Joint Standing Committee on Veterans and Legal Affairs has voted unanimously to report the following bill(s) out "Ought Not to Pass":

L.D. 48 An Act to Clarify Provisions of the Cannabis Legalization Act
Regarding Labels, Packaging and Testing

L.D. 2232 An Act to Limit Contributions to Political Action Committees That
Make Independent Expenditures

This is notification of the Committee's action.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Craig V. Hickman".

S/Sen. Craig V. Hickman
Senate Chair

S/Rep. Laura Supica
House Chair